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I. INTRODUCTION
"Profit goes with liability."' This concise statement from the
Qur'an captures the time-honored tenet of partnership law that per-
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. I thank the South Texas
College of Law for the invitation to the Symposium on Ethical Obligations and Liabilities
Arising from Lawyers' Professional Associations. Special thanks to Professor Teresa Col-
lett and the members of the South Texas Law Review for their assistance. I appreciated the
comments and insights of the panelists and the audience who participated in the sympo-
sium. I also thank Dean W. Frank Newton and Professors William R. Casto, Timothy W.
Floyd, and Dean Pawlowic for their observations.
1. S.M. Hasanuzzaman, Limited Liability of Shareholders: An Islamic Perspective, 28
ISLAMIC STUD. 353, 353 (1989) (referring to sayings of the Prophet Mohammed as revealed
in the Qur'an). For an explanation of the rights and obligations of Islamic joint ventures,
see generally Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Partnership and Profit-Sharing, in ISLAMIC
LAW (1985).
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sons can only claim a profit if they are willing to risk loss.' Although
history reveals various vehicles used by business people to limit their
liability,3 the general partnership principle of "all for one, one for all"
remained intact for most of the twentieth century.4 Then out of the
ashes of the savings and loan debacle rose the limited liability partner-
ship (LLP).
In the eyes of many, the LLP was a "new and improved" form of
general partnership.5 Some commentators downplayed the effect of
the LLP legislation by referring to it as a "garden variety general part-
nership ' or a "new-fangled version" of the classic general partner-
ship.7 Others, including partnership expert Alan R. Bromberg,
appreciated that the LLP structure amounted to a radical departure
from the principles of general partnership law in allowing partners to
limit their liability.8 Now with the advent of the LLP, partners expect
2. See Hasanuzzaman, supra note 1, at 353 (arguing that the legal maxim, "profits
are concomitant to risk," applies to individual and partnership business, but does not apply
to joint stock companies).
3. For a historical discussion of the development of limited liability vehicles begin-
ning with Roman law, see generally Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability in Historical
Perspective, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 615 (1997).
4. In defining a partnership as "[a] voluntary contract between two or more compe-
tent persons to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful
commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a proportional sharing of
the profits and losses between them," Black's Law Dictionary reflects this traditional view
of a partnership as an enterprise in which partners share risks and profits. BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 1120 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Burr v. Greenland, 356 S.W.2d 370, 376 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Hester, Keeping Liability at Bay, Bus L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb.
1996, at 59, 59 (referring to the LLP as a "new form of entity [that] is rapidly gaining
acceptance and becoming the form of choice for many accounting and law firms and other
professional ventures seeking to insulate their members against liability for debts while
preserving their status as partnerships").
6. John R. Marquis, Creating a Michigan Limited Liability Partnership, 74 MICH. B.J.
698, 698 (1995).
7. Allison L. Bergman, Covering Your Assets: Missouri's New Limited Liability Part-
nership Law, 63 UMKC L. REV. 679, 679 (1995).
8. In his testimony before the Texas House of Representatives, Professor Alan R.
Bromberg referred to the first LLP proposal as "'a radical restructuring' of partnership law
... [which was] not needed, and it's poor public policy." Walter Borges, Partners' Liability
Bill Hits Rough House Waters, TEX. LAW., May 13, 1991, at 7. After the Texas Legislature
adopted the first LLP legislation, Professor Bromberg made a similar observation in offi-
cial comments following the statutory provisions.. As stated, "In a dramatic break from
two centuries of tradition, Texas in 1991 permitted partnerships to shield partners from any
individual liability for most partnership obligations arising from certain of another part-
ner's (or a representative's) misconduct." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 cmt.
(Source and Comments by Alan R. Bromberg-1991 Amendments) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
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to share profits without subjecting themselves to personal liability for
all partnership losses.9
The actual liability shield for LLPs varies from state to state. In
1991, Texas adopted the nation's first LLP legislation limiting part-
ners' vicarious liability for malpractice claims arising out of the acts or
omissions of other firm representatives. 10 Most states followed this
original Texas model which applies to tort-type claims." Other states,
including New York and Minnesota, extend LLP partners a "full
shield" to cover all firms' debts and obligations. 2 With statutory
amendments effective September 1, 1997, Texas became a full shield
state.'3 This full shield protection provides partners liability protec-
9. In other countries, including Belgium, France, Italy, and Japan, the rules of profes-
sional conduct prohibit attorneys from limiting their liability. See LAW WrIoUT FRON-
TIERS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS APPLICABLE TO
THE CROss-BORDER PRACTICE OF LAW 34, 76, 99, 222 (Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995) (report-
ing on a survey conducted by the International Bar Association). Although the United
Kingdom does not currently allow for limited liability partnerships, one commentator has
predicted that within the next two to three years the United Kingdom will enact some form
of limited liability partnership law. See Tony Sacker, Firms in U.K. Grow More Competi-
tive, NAT'L L.J., May 26, 1997, at B9, B15.
10. In amending the Texas Uniform Partnership Act, the Texas legislature created the
registered limited liability partnership (LLP) as a new type of entity to provide LLP part-
ners protection for debts and obligations of the LLP arising
from "errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance committed in
the course of the partnership business by another partner or representative of the
partnership not working under the supervision or direction of the first partner at
the time the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence or malfeasance oc-
curred, unless the first partner ... was directly involved in the specific activity" or
had notice or knowledge of the events that created the liability at the time of their
occurrence.
Steven A. Waters & Matthew D. Goetz, Partnerships, 45 Sw. L.J. 2011, 2022 (1992) (quot-
ing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (Vernon Supp. 1992)). For an insider's
account tracing the origins of the LLP, see Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liabil-
ity Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1065, 1066-74 (1995).
11. See Michael K. Pierce, Substantive Partnership Law: Special Problems of General
and Limited Partnerships, SB85 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 24 (1997).
12. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2) (West 1995) ("A partner of a limited lia-
bility partnership is not, merely on account of this status, personally liable for anything
chargeable to the partnership under sections 323.12 [wrongful acts] and 323.13 [breach of
trust], or for any other debts or obligations of the [LLP] .... ), with N.Y. PARTNERSHIP
LAW § 26(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997) ("[N]o partner... is liable or accountable, directly or
indirectly (including by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise), for any debts,
obligations or liabilities of, or chargeable to, the registered limited liability partnership or
each other, whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise,.., solely by reason of being such
a partner .... ). Notwithstanding the statutory elimination of indemnification and contri-
bution, partnership agreements can still require indemnification and contribution. In that
event, the contractual provisions would bind partners.
13. Act of May 13, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 375, § 113, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6
(Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. REVISED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6132b-
3.08) (broadening the LLP shield to cover "debts and obligations of the partnership in-
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tion comparable to that enjoyed by shareholders in professional cor-
porations (PCs). Like shareholders in PCs, an LLP partner continues
to be liable for the partner's own acts and omissions and may be liable
for the acts and omissions of those persons supervised by the
partner.
14
Regardless of a particular state's legislative scheme, many practi-
tioners believe that an LLP provides them the best of both worlds in
enabling owners to obtain partnership tax treatment while shielding
partners from vicarious liability for certain partnership obligations.'
The LLP structure appeals to law firm owners who prefer to continue
to call themselves "partners"' 6 and to function as a general partner-
ship,' 7 rather than forming a new entity such as a professional corpo-
ration or limited liability company (LLC).'8 Unlike newly created
curred while the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership"). "This provision,
however, does not apply to the liability of a partnership to pay its debts and obligations out
of partnership property, the liability of a partner, if any, imposed by law or contract inde-
pendently of the partner's status as a partner... ." Curtis W. Huff, The New 1997 Legisla-
tive Update Business Organizations Laws in U. Houston L. Foundation-Current Issues
Affecting Partnerships, Limited Partnerships, and Limited Liability Companies A-i, A-25
(June 12-13, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the South Texas Law Review).
14. "Most LLP statutes ... make reference to continuing personal liability both for
[an attorney's] own acts and for the conduct of others that [the attorney] directly super-
vises and controls." Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers: General Partners
Need Not Apply, 51 Bus. LAW. 85, 112 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Limited Liability for
Lawyers] (reviewing differing approaches to imposing supervisory responsibility).
15. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Summa, Should You Convert Your Practice to a Limited Liabil-
ity Company, L. PRAC. MGMT., Sept. 1996, at 26, 26 (commending state legislators for
adopting LLC and LLP statutes which give lawyers "access to both single-level taxation
and personal liability protection").
16. See Dale A. Oesterle & Wayne M. Gazur, What's in a Name?: An Argument for a
Small Business "Limited Liability Entity" Statute (With Three Subsets of Default Rules), 32
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 101, 113 (1997) (suggesting that professional firms prefer "the LLP
form largely because of client perceptions" of "hot-shot" lawyers in firms as "partners,"
not "members"). Firm attorneys who want to continue to use the partner designation may
prefer the LLP structure because members of LLCs and shareholders of professional cor-
porations risk the "inadvertent assumption of personal liability" if they refer to other eq-
uity holders as "partners." Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships and
Other Entities Authorized in Colorado, 24 COLO. LAW. 1525, 1525 (1995) [hereinafter Keat-
inge et al., LLPs in Colorado].
17. One author describes the following three reasons why law firm owners prefer the
general partnership: (1) general partnerships usually need not abide by state laws gov-
erning corporations, which require formalities such as bylaws and franchise tax returns; (2)
general partnerships can allocate profits and losses among partners and establish other
rights and obligations through their partnership agreements; and (3) partnership net in-
come enjoys a single level of taxation at the partner level. See John W. Simpson, L.L.C.
and L.L.P. Formats Can Benefit Law Firms, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 1996, at Bll, Bll.
18. LLCs must comply with certain formalities, such as adoption of operating agree-
ments, while LLPs can continue to use existing partnership agreements. Professor Dennis
S. Karjala warns that extensive informality in operating an LLC can jeopardize the limited
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LLCs, LLPs can rely on the established body of partnership rules and
laws.' 9 This combination of LLP features and advantages proved to
be irresistible to attorneys and accountants who lobbied for LLP legis-
lation.2" Even a prominent Texas plaintiff's attorney who testified
against the proposed LLP bill became one of the first to register his
firm as an LLP once the legislation passed. 1
Starting with the adoption of the first LLP statute in Texas in
1991,22 LLP legislation, like LLC legislation, swept through the coun-
try with limited debate and resistance.23 As described by law firm
partnership expert Professor Robert W. Hillman: "Like Diogenes
wandering the streets of Athens, lantern in hand, searching for the
honest man, anyone seeking evidence of a debate among lawmakers
over the wisdom of limited liability or the cost-shifting consequences
of LLCs and LLPs is destined for disappointment."24 By mid-1997,
liability that the owners sought in forming the LLC. See Dennis S. Karjala, Planning
Problems in the Limited Liability Company, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 455, 463 (1995).
19. See Keatinge et al., LLPs in Colorado, supra note 16, at 1525 ("[TJhe LLP may
avail itself of the longstanding rules developed for partnerships in many nontax areas,
where the rules for LLCs are still evolving.").
20. See Louis A. Mezzullo et al., Choice of Entity, C980 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1121, 1181
(1995) (noting that the "impetus behind the adoption of LLP Acts has come mainly from
professionals, particularly from the larger multi-state accounting firms"). The first LLP bill
applied only to professional partnerships. After critics argued that the bill was discrimina-
tory and unfair to non professionals, Professor Alan R. Bromberg revised the bill to extend
the liability limitation to all partnerships. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNI-
FORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 1.01(a), at 4 (1997). The accounting profession, led by the Ac-
countants' Coalition, pushed for adoption of LLP legislation because LLCs "are not
particularly well-suited for accounting firms with multi-state practices." Dan L. Gold-
wasser, As the Dust Settles, in ACCOUNTANTS' LI~aILr 1995, at 21 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 526, 1995).
.21. Joe Longley, a successful Austin litigator, and other trial attorneys criticized the
LLP form because they felt that it would "severely restrict the ability of plaintiffs to re-
cover damages in malpractice suits against doctors, lawyers, accountants and other profes-
sionals." Walter Borges, Liability Shield Catches On: Firms Rush to Have New "LLP"
Protection, TEx. LAW., Oct. 21, 1991, at 1.
22. The LLP was "exceptionally popular," with more than 1200 Texas firms, including
virtually all the state's largest firms, registering as LLPs within one year after enactment of
the Texas LLP legislation. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1065-66.
23. Although the plaintiffs' bar in some states opposed the LLP and LLC legislation,
"the dominant trend has been toward permitting limited liability with few conditions."
Wayne M. Gazur, The Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited Flexibility, Un-
certain Role, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 177-78 (1995) (identifying the various con-
stituencies supporting the LLC movement). Reportedly, the Connecticut bill faced "no
opposition," and the Minnesota bill passed with little debate, causing one Minnesota legis-
lator to describe the LLC legislative process as a "bipartisan love fest." Id. at 178 n.249
(quoting from newspaper accounts).
24. Robert W. Hillman, New Forms and New Balances: Organizing the External Rela-
tions of the Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 613, 613 (1997). For a law and
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forty-nine states and the District of Columbia permitted the LLP
form.2 5
As the LLC and LLP evolved, legal scholars and practitioners
devoted countless hours and pages to analyzing the new liability struc-
tures. 26 Tax and business attorneys have compared the features of dif-
ferent unincorporated associations with pass-through partnership
taxation.27 Some authors have written survey articles28 while others
have focused on the limited liability legislation in a particular state.29
Academicians, including law and economics scholars, have debated
the wisdom and efficiency of limited liability and the effects of altering
the traditional partnership rules.30 In these discussions, the ethical as-
economics analysis of the reasons why the LLC structure gained widespread and rapid
legislative approval, see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the
Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Com-
petition, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629, 657-86 (1997).
25: See Lorna S. Wassdorf, State Filing Issues, in U. Houston L. Foundation-Current
Issues Affecting Partnerships, Limited Partnerships, and Limited Liability Companies 1
(June 12-13, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the South Texas Law Review).
Wyoming is the only state which has not adopted an LLP statute. See id. California, Ne-
vada, Oregon, and New York permit only professionals to operate as LLPs. See BROM-
BERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, § 1.01(d), at 16.
26. See, e.g., Symposium, The Future of the Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 389 (1997); Symposium, The Revolution of the Limited Liability Entity, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1 (1997); Symposium, LLCs, LLPs and the Evolving Corporate Form, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 855 (1995). The Practising Law Institute has devoted entire courses to
studying the new liability structures. See, e.g., FORMING AND USING LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS: 1994 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B-869, 1994).
27. See Stuart Levine, Tax Aspects of Limited Liability Companies, Limited Liability
Partnerships, Limited Liability Limited Partnerships, and Other Novel Entities, Q249 ALI-
ABA 45, 49-55 (1996); Prentiss Willson, Jr., State Taxation of Limited Liability Companies
and Partnerships, in TAX PLANNING FOR JOINT VENTURES, PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 383 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 383, 1996).
28. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures For Unincorporated Firms, 64 U. CIN.
L. REV. 319, 321 (1996) (discussing new forms of unincorporated business associations);
Allan G. Donn, Limited Liability Entities for Law Firms, in THE BEST ENTITY FOR DOING
ThE DEAL: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 239, 239-61 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. B-937, 1996); Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers, supra note 14, at
85-91.
29. See, e.g., John W. Larson, Florida's New Partnership Law: The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act and Limited Liability Partnerships, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 201, 202-03
(1995); Louis F. Lobenhofer, Limited Liability Entities in Ohio: A Primer on the Limited
Liability Company and Partnership with Limited Liability, Their Substantive and Tax As-
pects, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 39, 39 (1994).
30. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 24, at 629-33; Robert W. Hillman,
Limited Liability and Externalization of Risk: A Comment on the Death of Partnership, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 477, 477-78 (1992); Mark Rosencrantz, Comment, You Wanna Do What?
Attorneys Organizing as Limited Liability Partnerships and Companies: An Economic
Analysis, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 349, 351 (1996); Thomas A. Denker, Note, Lawyers and
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pects of attorneys practicing in limited liability entities have largely
been glossed over or ignored." Before this symposium, few articles
had focused on the professional responsibility issues related to attor-
neys practicing in limited liability firms.32 I hope to contribute to the
discussion by surveying the professional responsibility and liability is-
sues related to attorneys practicing in limited liability law firms.
Part I tackles the 1996 ethics opinion on limited liability partner-
ships rendered by the American Bar Association Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (ABA Ethics Committee).
In criticizing the ABA opinion, I first examine the conclusions and
reasoning articulated in the opinion, identify disciplinary rules that the
opinion did not address, and consider the possible effects of the ABA
ethics opinion. Part II focuses on some professional liability issues
raised by attorneys practicing in LLPs. The conclusion calls for reex-
amination of the ABA opinion on LLPs, as well as the manner in
which ethics opinions are rendered. Finally, I challenge the newly cre-
ated ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, called "Ethics 2000," to revisit professionalism and
quality issues as they relate to attorneys practicing in limited liability
law firms.
II. CRITICISM OF THE ABA ETHICS OPINION ON LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS
A. Overview of the ABA Ethics Opinion
Five years after the passage of the first LLP legislation in 1991,
the ABA Ethics Committee33 issued Formal Opinion 96-401 (ABA
Limited Liability for Arizona's Professionals: Deliverance or Damnation?, 37 ARIz. L.
REv. 355, 356-57 (1995).
31. Most authors who cover the use of limited liability entities by professionals note
that particular statutes authorize use of the vehicles by attorneys. See, e.g., Dirk G. Chris-
tensen & Scott F. Bertschi, LLC Statutes: Use by Attorneys, 29 GA. L. REv. 693, 695 (1995)
("[M]ost states either expressly or implicitly authorize a limited liability company to render
professional services."). Some authors explain that the highest court in the state must ap-
prove attorneys practicing in limited liability entities. See, e.g., Hester, supra note 5, at 61.
32. See Allan W. Vestal, Special Ethical and Fiduciary Challenges for Law Firms
Under the New and Revised Unincorporated Business Forms, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 445,
446-47 & n.2 (1998). For a review of liability theories and ethics issues related to the new
limited liability entities, see Robert R. Keatinge & George W. Coleman, Practice of Law
by Limited Liability Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, PROF. LAW., 1995 Sym-
posium Issue, at 5.
33. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility ("ABA
Ethics Committee"), previously called the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics,
consists of ten members. See ABA CoNsrTurIoN AND BY-LAWS art. 31.7 (1997-98). By
the concurrence of a majority of its members, the committee may "express its opinion on
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Ethics Opinion) relating to lawyers practicing in limited liability part-
nerships.34 In this opinion, the ABA Ethics Committee answers the
question of whether, consistent with the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules), lawyers may practice in limited liability
firms." After mentioning "potentially applicable rules" and other
committee opinions, the ABA Ethics Committee opines that the limi-
tation on liability provided by the LLP structure does not violate the
Model Rules.36 In explaining its conclusion, the ABA Ethics Commit-
tee states that it found no requirement in the Model Rules that law-
yers be vicariously liable for the malpractice of their partners.37 The
opinion then discusses the possible applicability of the Model Rules
relating to prospective limits on liability, communications with clients,
and supervisory responsibilities.38
B. Prospective Limits on Liability
The reference to specific rules starts with Model Rule 1.8(h),
which prohibits an attorney from making an agreement prospectively
limiting a lawyer's malpractice liability, unless certain conditions are
met.39  The ABA Ethics Committee disposes of this rule on two
proper professional or judicial conduct, either on its own initiative or when requested to do
so by a member of the bar or the judiciary." Id. For a discussion of the evolution of the
ABA Ethics Committee and the availability of ethics opinions, see Jorge L. Carro, The
Ethics Opinions of the Bar: A Valuable Contribution or an Exercise in Futility?, 26 IND. L.
REV. 1, 9-15 (1992).
34. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-401 (1996)
[hereinafter ABA Ethics Opinion]. The ABA Ethics Committee may issue either Formal
or Informal Opinions. "Formal Opinions are those upon subjects the [ABA Ethics] Com-
mittee determines to be of widespread interest or unusual importance ... [and] [o]ther
opinions are Informal Opinions." ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Rules of Procedure, reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, 1998 SELECTED STATUTES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 635-36 (1998)
[hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
35. ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 1.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 2.
38. See id.
39. According to Model Rule 1.8(h):
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability
to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently
represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an
unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing
that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1997). Rule 1.8(h) recognizes
the inherent conflict of interest created when attorneys attempt to prospectively limit their
malpractice liability. "It is difficult to think of a situation more clearly involving a conflict
between the client's and the lawyer's interests than one in which the lawyer attempts pro-
spectively to limit his liability to a client or attempts to settle a client's malpractice claim
1998] PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY ISSuES 407
grounds. First, the committee states that the Model Rule 1.8(h) limi-
tation does not apply because attorneys in LLPs remain liable for
their own malpractice.4 Second, the ABA Ethics Committee indi-
cates that the provisions of Model Rule 1.8(h) do not apply because
the "limitation on vicarious liability created by LLPs derives solely
from state law, not from an agreement between a lawyer and his
client."
4 1
The ABA does not cite any independent authority for its position
that the LLP limit on vicarious liability does not violate Model Rule
1.8(h) because attorneys remain liable for their own malpractice.
Rather, the opinion refers to a similar conclusion reached in an earlier
ethics opinion dealing with practice in PCs. 42 The earlier opinion in-
terpreted the original ABA Canons of Ethics, including Canon 35,
which stated that "a lawyer's relationship to his client should be per-
sonal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client., 43 The
ABA Canons of Ethics, however, did not expressly prohibit attorneys
from attempting to limit their liability."
The prohibition on attorneys prospectively limiting their liability
first appeared in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code). 45 Interestingly, the Preliminary Draft of the Model
Code only used an ethical consideration to cover prospective limits of
liability. As first proposed, the ethical consideration stated, "A lawyer
should not seek to limit his liability to his client for malpractice by
contract, limitation of corporate liability, or otherwise. With respect
to clients, the liability of lawyers who are stockholders in a professional
legal corporation should be the same as if they were practicing as part-
directly." ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & JOHN F. SuTrON, JR., A GUIDE TO THE TEXAS Disci-
PLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 139 (1990).
40. See ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 1. In addition to noting that state and
local bar association opinions had reached a similar conclusion, the ABA Ethics Commit-
tee referred to its Formal Opinion 303 dealing with law practice in professional corpora-
tions. See id. Formal Opinion 303 concluded that attorneys could practice in professional
corporations if specific criteria are met. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal
Op. 303 (1961). The first criterion requires that attorneys remain personally responsible to
the client. See id. In the case of an LLP, the ABA Ethics Committee believes that this
criterion could be satisfied because attorneys in an LLP remain liable for their own negli-
gence. See ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 1.
41. ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 1.
42. See id.
43. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961).
44. According to the Formal Opinion 303 "it is possible [to] ... impose[ ] limited
liability without violating any of the Canons of Ethics". Id.
45. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(c) (1983).
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ners."46 The final version of the Model Code included both a discipli-
nary rule and an ethical consideration relating to prospective limits on
liability. Disciplinary Rule 6-102(a) states that "[a] lawyer shall not
attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for
his personal malpractice.' '47 If the language of this rule is ambiguous,
canons of construction could provide interpretative guidance.48 Ap-
plying commonly used canons of construction, the words "personal
malpractice" should be given effect 49 and the disciplinary rule should
be interpreted in conjunction with the related Ethical Considerations
under Canon 6.50 As explained in Ethical Consideration 6-6, "A law-
yer who is a stockholder in or is associated with a professional legal
corporation may, however, limit his liability for malpractice of his as-
sociates in the corporation, but only to the extent permitted by law."51
Both the reference in Disciplinary Rule 6-102(a) to "personal mal-
practice" and the Ethical Consideration 6-6 indicate that the prohibi-
tion in Disciplinary Rule 6-102 does not apply to attorneys' efforts to
46. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (Preliminary Draft
1969) (emphasis added).
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102(A) (1983) (emphasis
added). The comparable New York rule also qualifies the reference to liability by stating
that: "A lawyer shall not seek, by contract or other means, to limit prospectively the law-
yer's individual liability to a client for malpractice ... ." NEW YORK DISCIPLINARY RULE
6-102(A) (1992) (emphasis added). In considering this rule within the context of LLP and
LLC statutes, the Ethics Committee for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
states that the New York Disciplinary Rule 6-102 does not apply because the LLC and LLP
"statutes clearly do not absolve the lawyer from liability for his or her own 'individual'
malpractice nor for that of anyone supervised by the lawyer." Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of N.Y. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1995-7 (1995). Compare
New York County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 703 (1994) (conclud-
ing that attorneys practicing in LLPs and LLCs do not violate New York Disciplinary Rule
6-102).
48. Canons of statutory construction can be applied in construing court rules like the
ABA Model Rules. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 95-396 (1995) (dissent of Ralph G. Elliot).
49. See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, DRAFTING LEGISLATION AND RULES IN PLAIN ENG-
LISH 29 (1991).
50. In construction, "statutes in pari materia (on the same subject matter) should be
read together." HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 64 (2d ed.
1991). Applying this canon to interpret the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code), the ethical considerations and disciplinary rules under the Model Code
should be interpreted consistently to allow attorneys in professional corporations to limit
their vicarious liability for acts and omissions of "associates.".
51. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-6 (1983). The term "asso-
ciates" appears to refer to employed firm attorneys rather than firm principals holding
equity interests. Although the definition section of the Model Code does not define "asso-
ciates," other sections of the Model Code use the terms "partner" and "associate." See,
e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D)(4)(b) (1983).
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limit their vicarious liability for an "associate's" malpractice, as op-
posed to their "personal" or direct liability.
Model Rule 1.8(h) "clarifies and modifies [Disciplinary Rule] 6-
102 of the predecessor Model Code by differentiating between pro-
spective limitations of liability and settlements or defenses to existing
malpractice claims."' 52 In one respect, Model Rule 1.8(h) appears to
be broader than the predecessor disciplinary rule. Unlike the discipli-
nary rule, Model Rule 1.8(h) does not refer to "personal.malpractice."
Unlike Ethical Consideration 6-6, which clearly states that a stock-
holder in a professional corporation may "limit his liability for [the]
malpractice of his associates, '5 3 the Comments to the Model Rules do
not include such a qualification.
Did the drafters of the Model Rules and its accompanying Com-
ments intentionally omit the reference to "personal malpractice,"54
and the qualification for PCs, or did the drafters simply overlook the
matter, implicitly adopting the earlier construction?55 If the text of
the rule is ambiguous, the answer to this question can affect the inter-
pretation of Model Rule 1.8(h).56 With ambiguity, canons of construc-
tion can be considered in interpreting whether the prohibition in
Model Rule 1.8(h) applies to practice in LLPs. For example, one es-
tablished canon of construction disfavors repeal by implication.57
Similarly, a prior legal rule should be retained if nothing in the legisla-
52. ABA CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h), at 135 (3d ed. 1996).
53. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-6 (1983).
54. If the term "personal malpractice" could be viewed as essential to the construc-
tion of the prohibition under Disciplinary Rule 6-102, then omission of the term from the
later adopted Model Rules could evidence an intent to change the meaning. See, e.g.,
Bentkamp v. United States, 40 C.C.P.A. 70, 77 (1952) (explaining that a change of legisla-
tive language is presumed to evidence an intent on the part of Congress to effect a change
in meaning; however, the court limited its holding by stating that this rule is not hard and
fast and noting that exceptions exist).
55. The legislative history of the Model Rules does not provide much guidance on
whether the drafters intended 1.8(h) to cover prospective limits on vicarious liability. See
ABA CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES 60-62, 64, 65, 67-68 (1987); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES,
THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
Ducr § 1.8:901, at 281 (Supp. 1997) (discussing the adoption of Rule 1.8 and its proviso,
"unless permitted by law").
56. "Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction."
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305 (1957).
57. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (stating that the intent to
repeal must be "clear and manifest").
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tive history shows explicit intent to change it. 8 This canon supports
the interpretation that Model Rule 1.8(h), like the predecessor rule,
does not prohibit limits on vicarious liability for the malpractice of
"associates."
Commentators, including Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and
W. William Hodes, agree that the Model Rule prohibition does not
prevent lawyers from limiting their vicarious liability.5 9 Given this
view, the predecessor Code provisions, and the widespread use of
PCs,6" the ABA Ethics Committee could have justified its position
that the LLP limit on vicarious liability did not violate Model Rule
1.8.
On the other hand, the committee's conclusion that Model Rule
1.8 does not apply to the LLP liability shield because there "is not an
agreement with a client prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability"'"
ignores the realities of the attorney-client relationship. In most cases,
an attorney-client relationship commences when an attorney/firm and
the prospective client enter an oral or written representation agree-
ment. The identity of the attorney and structure of the firm entering
into the attorney-client relationship should be viewed as one aspect of
58. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 (1991) (noting that silence indicates the
lack of intent to change the rule).
59. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 55, § 1.8:901, at 282 (stating that "[niothing in the
Model Rules, or the Code of Professional Responsibility before it, prohibit [attorneys' at-
tempts to limit their vicarious liability]" and predicting that "future decisions are likely to
sustain the limitation"). See also LAws. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCr (ABA/BNA) 51:1101
(1996) (citing the ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 96-401 and other ethics opinions). The
ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 96-401 and other ethics opinions are cited by the Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct in support of the following statement:
It is generally acknowledged that in preventing attorneys from attempting to limit
personal liability to their own clients, Rule 1.8(h) and DR 6-102(A) do not pre-
vent lawyers from organizing their practice as a limited liability partnership, lim-
ited liability company, or professional corporation in order to limit their personal
liability for misconduct committed by other lawyers in the firm.
Id. at 51:1111 (citations omitted).
60. In the opinion of Steven C. Krane, the Chair of the Committee on Professional
and Judicial Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, attorneys should
take "[c]onsiderable comfort... from 24 years of unquestioning acceptance, as a matter of
both law and ethics, of lawyer professional corporations in New York, a fact that should by
itself dispose of any material concerns as to the propriety of the new limited liability enti-
ties." Stephen C. Krane, An Ethical Lawyer's Guide to LLC Firms, 212 N.Y. L.J. 1, 4
(1994).
61. ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 1. Compare Marilyn B. Cane & Helen R.
Franco, Limited Liability in Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: How Does the Flor-
ida RLLP Measure Up?, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1299, 1315 (1996) ("Because the limiting of a
lawyer's liability under the LLP Act is self-executing and, therefore, requires no additional
agreement between the lawyer and the client, the [Florida] Act does not violate the prohi-
bition on entering into liability-restricting agreements in the [Florida] Bar rule.").
[Vol. 39:399
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the representation agreement. In entering the representation agree-
ment, the client accepts the terms of the agreement, including the per-
sons to perform services.62 Therefore, the limited liability nature of
the firm as a party to the agreement can be treated as part of the
representation agreement.63
Query whether the ABA Ethics Committee would reach a differ-
ent conclusion if a firm's representation agreement included a provi-
sion expressly limiting the vicarious liability of firm owners.'r Such a
provision in the representation agreement which clearly spells out the
limited liability shield provides more information to clients than an
agreement which merely refers to the firm as an LLP.65 As suggested
by Professor Charles W. Wolfram, partners should not be permitted
"to limit the malpractice liability of partners in a transaction that is
secret and of which the client need be given no notice. ' 66 The ABA
Ethics Opinion on PCs recognized the importance of informing clients
of the firm's limited liability structure in stating that "[r]estrictions on
liability as to other lawyers in the organization must be made apparent
62. When a client retains a lawyer practicing in a firm, "the lawyer's firm assumes the
authority and responsibility of representing that client, unless the circumstances indicate
otherwise." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. h (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
63. Admittedly, an LLP firm and prospective client do not technically enter an agree-
ment which expressly limits the attorneys' liability. Still, courts recognize that an attorney-
client relationship may be based on an express or implied contract. See, e.g., Simpson v.
James, 903 F.2d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 1990). In an ethics opinion addressing conflicts in a
family context, the ABA Ethics Committee refers to the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers in stating that a "client-lawyer relationship does not, however, require
an explicit agreement, let alone a written letter of engagement: it may come into being as a
result of reasonable expectations and a failure of the lawyer to dispel those expectations."
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995).
64. Professor Charles W. Wolfram explains that such a provision would both violate
applicable ethics rules and public policy. See Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the
Crucible of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REv.
359, 370-73 (1998). A recent ethics opinion concluded that language in a retainer agree-
ment that limits the amount of damages in a malpractice action violates the California
ethics rule prohibiting a "contract with a client prospectively limiting the member's liability
to the client for the member's professional malpractice." Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n
Professional Responsibility and Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 489 (1997). Courts have disci-
plined attorneys for using contractual provisions to limit their liability. See, e.g., People v.
Foster, 716 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Colo. 1986) (suspending an attorney who inserted a clause
in a client's stock purchase agreement that released the attorney from liability for claims
arising from the transaction).
65. As provided in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, a lawyer
can limit a duty to a client if the client is "adequately informed" and "the terms of the
limitation are reasonable in the circumstances." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 30 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
66. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 16.2.4, at 890 (1986) (refer-
ring to the practice of law in professional corporations).
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to the client."67 In the next section of its opinion on LLPs, the ABA
Ethics Committee applies this criterion in considering the measures
that LLP firms use in making the liability restriction apparent to
clients.
C. LLP Designation and Communications with Clients
Although the members of the ABA Ethics Committee agreed
that the restriction on liability must be "made apparent to the cli-
ent,"68 they parted ways on the amount of disclosure necessary to
inform clients as to the limitation on liability.69 A minority of the
committee expressed concern "that the use of initials, without more, is
not sufficient to make the limitation of liability apparent to the cli-
ent."7 The majority believed that the use of abbreviations "places
clients on notice that their lawyer is practicing in a particular business
form, and encourages them to inquire if they are in doubt as to its
implications for them."'" When clients do inquire about the form of
entity, the ABA Ethics Opinion states that "a lawyer must clearly ex-
plain the limitation of liability features of his firm's business organiza-
tion."72 Unless faced with such a client inquiry, the ABA opinion
does not require that lawyers explain the restriction on liability.73
Every statute creating limited liability entities specifies that the
firm include in its name a notation or reference to its limited liability
structure. 4 Most statutes require the initials "LLP" (with or without
67. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961).
68. ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 2.
69. The ABA Ethics Committee issues an opinion only with the concurrence of five
committee members. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 34, at 636.
When drafting an opinion, policy statement or other document to be publicly dis-
seminated, the Committee shall make every effort to reach a consensus. When,
after a full examination of the issues and an exchange of views, the Committee
cannot reach a consensus, a dissenting opinion may be appropriate to express the
views of a Committee member or members.
Id. No ABA Ethics Committee member published a dissenting opinion in connection with
the ABA Ethics Opinion on LLPs.
70. ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. "As an aside, [the committee] note[s] that the use of [] statutorily required or
permitted abbreviation[s, such as L.L.P.],... satisfies the requirements of Model Rules 7.1
and 7.5(a) that a lawyer's public communications not be 'misleading' or 'deceptive."' Id.
The ABA Ethics Committee also indicated that references to an LLP as "a partnership"
should not be viewed as a misrepresentation because LLPs are indeed partnerships. See id.
74. See Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers, supra note 14, at 120. Under the Pro-
totype Registered LLP Act, "[t]he name of a registered limited liability partnership shall
contain the words 'Registered Limited Liability Partnership' or 'Limited Liability Partner-
ship,' or the abbreviation 'R.L.L.P.' or 'L.L.P.' or the designation 'RLLP' or 'LLP' as the
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periods), "Limited Liability Partnership," or "Registered Limited Lia-
bility Partnership" as the last letters or words in the partnership
name." "The policy underlying the name requirement is to maximize
notice to the world concerning the fact that a partnership has elected
LLP status and is an LLP."'76 To give notice, a few states like New
York require publication in a local newspaper for a certain number of
days after the LLP registration date.77 Beyond the name change in all
states and the publication in a few states, LLP statutes do not require
that the LLP notify its customers, creditors, clients, or patients.78
Other than compliance with the minimum statutory requirement
of using initials to designate the LLP, the ABA Ethics Opinion does
not require notice to clients and others dealing with the LLP. Based
upon "legislative approval of the use of initials and the relative unim-
portance, today, of the lawyer's business form for clients," most of the
committee members opined "that the use of initials, without more, is
adequate to meet ethical criteria. '79 The ABA Ethics Opinion does
not cite any authority or data to support its conclusion that the form
last words or letters of its name." ABA Bus. LAW SEC., COMM. ON PARTNERSHIPS AND
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, WORKING GROUP ON REGISTERED LIM-
ITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, PROTOTYPE REGISTERED LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNER-
SHIP ACT § 911, reprinted in BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, at 522.
75. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, suptra note 20, § 2.05, at 62. For a chart summarizing
each state's name requirements, see id. at 104.
76. Martin I. Lubaroff, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships-The Next Wave, 8
No. 5 INSIGHTS 23, 27 (1994). LLC statutes, like LLP statutes, generally require that the
LLC use the designation "limited liability company" or a specified abbreviation such as
"LLC." See Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic
Comparative Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44, 54 (1992) (noting that "[tihe apparent
purpose of the name provisions, taken together, is to provide notice to the public and
creditors that the [LLC] members are not personally liable for the liabilities of the LLC").
77. See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 121.1500(a), 121.1502(f) (McKinney Supp.
1997) (requiring that domestic and out-of-state LLPs publish a copy of the registration or
notice within 120 days after the effective registration date); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-
244D (West Supp. 1996) (requiring that notice be published in a general circulation news-
paper three times within 60 days of the LLP filing).
78. See R. Dennis Anderson et al., Registered LLPs, TEX. B.J., July 1992, at 728, 733.
"There have been discussions ... as to whether the lawyer has ethical obligations outside
the statutes to notify and explain to clients and potential clients the limitations on the
lawyer's professional liability under [LLP and LLC] entities." Ronald E. Mallen, Ethics/
Malpractice Issues: The Professional and Ethical Issues Facing the Attorney-Employee, in
THE BEST ENTITY FOR DOING THE DEAL 993, 1073 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 937, 1996) (referring to state bar ethics opinions). A few authors
recommend that partnerships notify their existing clients, patients, and customers of the
conversion to an LLP. See, e.g., Alson R. Martin, Limited Liability Companies (LLCs):
The New Game in Town, C936 ALI-ABA 89, 151 (1994).
79. ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 2. In concluding that the "use of the ab-
breviations or phrases permitted by the LLC or LLP statutes will in most cases provide
clients with sufficient notice," the ethics opinion of the Bar of New York City suggested
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of business is unimportant to clients. The relative importance of the
business form to clients could be determined if firms provide enough
information on the new liability structure, so that clients can make an
informed decision. Rather than requiring meaningful disclosure of
the restrictions on liability, the ABA Ethics Committee gives attor-
neys an ethical license to use the minimum initials.
The ABA Ethics Opinion also fails to explain how the minimum
initials "make apparent" the restriction on liability. In a narrow sense,
the LLP initials do "make apparent" the limited liability structure of
the firm when "apparent" means "readily seen."8 To the contrary,
initials alone do not "make apparent" the limited liability structure
when "apparent" is defined as "readily understood."'" Speaking can-
didly, firm attorneys would probably acknowledge that most clients do
not understand the alphabet soup included in firm names.82 Informa-
tion obtained from a recent survey of prospective clients clearly indi-
cates that most laypeople do not understand the effect of attorneys
practicing in limited liability firms, let alone the meaning of the initials
in a firm name.
On May 19, 1997, I mailed 220 questionnaires to a random sam-
ple of members of the Greater Houston Partnership, the Chamber of
Commerce for Houston, Texas.83 Within six weeks I received 93 com-
pleted questionnaires, resulting in a response rate of 42%. 4 Eighty-
five percent of the respondents (79 persons) reported that they did not
that attorneys consider whether the use of initials "is adequate in all circumstances." Ass'n
of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Op. 1995-7 (1995).
80. The Concise American Heritage Dictionary first defines "apparent" as "readily
seen; visible." THE CONCISE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 33 (1980). Webster's
Third New International Dictionary first defines "apparent" as "capable of easy perception:
as (a) readily perceptible to the senses, esp. sight: open to ready observation or full view:
unobstructed and unconcealed ... (b) capable of being readily perceived by the sensibili-
ties or understanding as certainly existent or present." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 102 (3d ed. 1971).
81. The second definition of "apparent" is "readily understood or perceived." THE
CONCISE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 33. The first definition of
"apparent" in Webster's Third New International Dictionary also connotes some level of
understanding. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 80,
at 102.
82. As bluntly stated by Professor John Dzienkowski, "It is also foolish to believe that
the majority of clients will understand what the designation at the end of the law firm name
means in practice." John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Malpractice and the Multistate Law Firm:
Supervision of Multistate Offices; Firms as Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predispute
Agreements to Arbitrate Client Malpractice Claims, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 967, 985 n.82 (1995).
83. In identifying the sample, I eliminated attorneys and foreign consulates listed as
members of the organization, but included physicians, some of whom practice as LLPs.
84. A copy of the survey instrument and results are on file with the South Texas Law
Review.
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"know how a law firm organizing itself as a limited liability partner-
ship or limited liability company affects the malpractice liability of the
firm's attorneys."85 Similarly, 85% (79 persons) indicated that they
did not know how incorporation affects attorney malpractice liability.
Presumably, the survey respondents as members of a metropolitan
Chamber of Commerce possess more business acumen than members
of the general population. Nevertheless, the vast majority of respon-
dents did not appreciate the significance of law firms operating as
PCs, LLCs or LLPs.86
Contrary to the unsupported ABA Ethics Opinion conclusion
that the lawyer's form of business is relatively unimportant,87 a signifi-
cant number of respondents believed that organizational structure was
"important." In response to the question, "Would it be important to
you if the organizational structure of a law firm affects the personal
liability of firm attorneys not directly involved in your representa-
tion?," 46% (43 persons) marked "yes," 23% (21 persons) marked
"no," and 31% (29 persons) marked "I don't know." Focusing on the
respondents who expressed an opinion on whether firm structure was
important, 67% recognized the importance of organizational structure
affecting the personal liability of firm attorneys not directly involved
in the representation. The large percentage of respondents (31%)
who marked "I don't know" suggests that those respondents either do
not understand the consequences of personal liability of firm attor-
neys or do not consider liability questions at the time that they retain
counsel.88
85. See survey instrument and results on file with the South Texas Law Review.
86. In June 1996, 1 obtained similar results in polling a random sample of members of
the Austin, Texas Chamber of Commerce. Ninety-one percent (55 of the 60 respondents)
reported that they did not understand the effect of law firms practicing as LLPs or LLCs
(survey results on file with the South Texas Law Review).
87. The ABA Ethics Committee based its opinion, in part, on "the relative unimpor-
tance, today, of the lawyer's business form for clients." ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note
34, at 2.
88. In challenging the law and economics assumptions that people act rationally in
considering events that might occur in the future, Professor Robert W. Hamilton made the
following observation:
It is an unusually sophisticated person who considers in advance what should hap-
pen if the other person does not do what he promised. An average person proba-
bly does not consider at all the consequences of what should happen if the other
party does not perform, or for that matter, what should happen if he himself does
not perform.
Robert W. Hamilton & Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and the Real World, 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 687, 696 (1997). This fascinating law review piece, consisting of an elec-
tronic mail debate, fleshes out various issues related to limited liability law firms.
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Sophisticated persons, such as lenders and landlords, who do un-
derstand the significance of the PC, LLC, and LLP initials, commonly
require personal guarantees from firm owners, pledges of firm receiv-
ables, or both. If sophisticated contract creditors demand personal
guarantees or security from members of limited liability law firms,
why should less sophisticated creditors settle for less, if given a
choice? a9
To enable clients to make informed decisions on matters affecting
representation, various Model Rules require client consultation with
full disclosure. 90 In requiring attorneys to communicate with clients,
Model Rule 1.4(b) expressly states that an attorney "shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation." 91 This rule "re-
quires the lawyer to provide the client with the information necessary
to make the client's participation informed and meaningful." 92 This
duty to explain matters to clients should extend to all aspects of repre-
89. In the opinion of one ethics expert:
It is much too early to tell whether clients will care one way or another whether
their lawyers are or are not limited liability entities, at least at the moment of
engagement. However, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that a sophisticated
client, given a choice between two otherwise equivalent and qualified firms for a
particular engagement, one of which is a limited liability entity and one of which
has retained the traditional joint and several liability, will select the firm where
the potential for recovery-if things do not work out as planned-is greater.
Anthony E. Davis, Limited Liability for Lawyers, PROF. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 1, 6.
90. See, for example, Model Rule 1.7(b) allows attorneys to handle a matter notwith-
standing a conflict if the client consents after consultation. As stated:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation
of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)(2) (1997). The terminology sec-
tion of the Model Rules defines "consultation" as "communication of information reason-
ably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question."
Id. Terminology. (1997).
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1997). "Although the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility had no express counterpart to Model
Rule 1.4, the obligation to communicate has been recognized throughout the history of the
legal system and the profession as the lawyer's duty." ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 52, at 34.
92. SCHUWERK & Su'TrON, JR., supra note 39, at 56 (referring to the comparable
Texas Rule of Professional Conduct and accompanying comment that parallels the com-
ment to Model Rule 1.4).
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sentation. Applying this rule to the terms of the initial engagement,
attorneys should be required to provide prospective clients with
enough information on the LLP structure so that prospective clients
can make an informed decision on hiring the LLP firm. Moreover,
clients who retained the firm before the LLP conversion should be
provided enough information so that they can make informed deci-
sions on retaining the LLP firm.9 3
Evidently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court appreciates the impor-
tance of attorneys informing clients and prospective clients of their
firm's limited liability status. The recently adopted amendment to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys
allowing attorneys to practice in LLPs and other limited liability orga-
nizations requires public notice, as well as actual notice to clients.94 In
addition to meeting other conditions,95 a limited liability law firm
must "[i]nclude a written designation of the limited liability structure
as part of its name."96 The use of abbreviations, such as LLP, will not
satisfy this provision.97 A firm must also "[p]rovide to clients and po-
tential clients in writing a plain-English summary of the features of the
limited liability law under which [the firm] is organized."98 This plain
English summary of the firm's liability provisions should enable cli-
ents and prospective clients to make informed decisions on retaining
limited liability law firms.
Unless firms provide laypeople with a plain English explanation
of the firm's liability features, communications by LLP attorneys may
actually confuse or mislead clients. Because LLP owners refer to each
other as "partners" and function as partners, clients may assume that
the firm is a traditional general partnership in which partners person-
93. For a discussion of approaches to disclosure and the civil liability risks associated
with not giving notice, see infra notes 158-200 and accompanying text.
94. WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 20:5:7
(West Supp. 1997).
95. Among other conditions, Wisconsin LLP law firms must maintain a current an-
nual registration and mandatory liability insurance with prescribed minimum coverage.
See id. Rule 20:5:7(b).
96. Id. Rule 20:5:7(e)(1).
97. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected language proposed by the Wisconsin State
Bar which would have allowed firms to use abbreviations in designating their liability
structure. See Clay R. Williams, LLCs, LLPs and S.C.s: The Rules for Lawyers Have
Changed, Wis. LAW., May 1997, at 10, 61 & n.17 (referring to a letter of Feb. 27, 1997 to the
Supreme Court clerk, requesting that the rule include the language "or an appropriate
abbreviation thereof").
98. WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
20:5:7(e)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
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ally share all risks and liabilities. As explained by Professor Robert
Hamilton:
How many people are dimly aware that when they deal with a
partnership that the personal credit of each partner stands be-
hind the firm? A great many, I suspect. How many will under-
stand that the little letters "L.L.P." on the door means [sic] that
the rule of personal liability has been changed for that partner-
ship? Not very many, I suspect. 99
One partner with a large Texas firm boasted that following conversion
to LLP status "[n]one of my clients asked about the change."'100
Maybe clients did not inquire about the change because they did not
understand the significance of the change, and because "little altered
in [the firm's] practice, day-to-day business, or client relationships."''
An early state ethics opinion recognized the potential for clients
to be confused or misled when dealing with LLP firms. In response to
a 1993 inquiry related to a Texas LLP which wanted to practice in the
District of Columbia (D.C.), the Legal Ethics Committee for the D.C.
Bar required LLP firms practicing in D.C. to include the words "regis-
tered limited liability partnership" in their firm names.'02 The 1993
opinion of the D.C. Ethics Committee reasoned:
The concept of a "registered limited liability partnership" (as
well as the concept of a "limited liability company") is unfamil-
iar to citizens of the District of Columbia, including many exper-
ienced lawyers .... (We note that the abbreviations "L.L.P."
and "L.L.C." are especially infelicitous in that they closely re-
semble the abbreviation "L.L.B.," which for decades until the
1970's the public and clients understood to be the description of
a person who possessed a law degree). 3
After the District of Columbia adopted its own LLP and LLC
legislation, the D.C. Legal Ethics Committee concluded that firms
99. Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1094 (explaining that the Minnesota statute which
covers tort and contract claims changes the "basic default rule of personal liability for
partnership law that has existed for centuries").
100. Why 569 Texas Laws Firms Just Switched to LLP, L. OFF. MGMT. AND ADMIN.
REP., Apr. 1994, at 1, 18 (quoting an administrative partner of the District of Columbia
branch of Baker & Botts).
101. Id.
102. See Legal Ethics Comm. of the D.C. Bar, Op. 235 (1993). While the other state
may permit the firm to use merely the abbreviation "L.L.P." or "L.L.C." after its name, as
the case may be, in the District the firm name must include the following: "registered
limited liability partnership" or "limited liability company." See id. "The only exception to
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could omit the full description after its name and use initials because
D.C. residents understood the implications of the abbreviations. °4
The original D.C. ethics opinion required firms to provide, upon
the receipt of inquiries from clients, an oral or written summary of the
limitation of liability feature of the applicable law.105 The ethics com-
mittee of the Kansas Bar Association went a step further in recom-
mending that "a full discussion take place with the firm's clients of
what is happening to the firm regarding the attorney-client relation-
ship."'"° Unlike the ABA Ethics Opinion, the Kansas opinion takes
into account clients' limited understanding of new limited liability
business structures and the potential for clients to believe that the firm
operates as a traditional partnership.107
The Kansas ethics opinion also reminds attorneys of their ethical
obligations to adhere to the "principles of vicarious liability" for acts
and omissions of other firm participants. As discussed below, the
ABA Ethics Opinion echoes the Kansas Ethics Opinion in noting that
the statutory limits on civil liability for LLP partners do not absolve
attorneys of their supervisory responsibilities under the ethics rules.
D. Responsibilities of Supervisors and Partners
The last section of the ABA opinion refers to the supervisory ob-
ligations for subordinate attorneys under Model Rule 5.1(b) 10 8 and
nonlawyer assistants under Model Rule 5.3(b).' 09 Specifically, it re-
104. See Legal Ethics Comm. of the D.C. Bar, Op. 254 (1995).
105. See id. Compare Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Professional
and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1995-7 (1995) ("[L]awyers changing to LLC or LLP form
should be prepared to answer any client questions regarding the nature of the change and
its ramifications."). The majority of the ABA Ethics Committee believe that "the [LLP]
abbreviation[s] place clients on notice that their lawyer is practicing in a particular business
form, and encourages them to inquire if they are in doubt as to its implications for them."
ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 2 ("When faced with such inquiries from clients, of
course, a lawyer must clearly explain the limitation of liability features of his firm's busi-
ness organization.").
106. Ethics Advisory Comm. of the Kansas Bar Ass'n, Op. 94-3 (1994). Although the
Kansas ethics committee believed that the Model Rule 1.8 prohibition on limiting liability
did not apply because the "LLP format is not an 'agreement' to limit liability," the commit-
tee thought "it appropriate that a full discussion take place with the firm's clients." Id. at 5.
107. See id.; see also New Mexico State Bar Advisory Opinions Comm., Op. 1996-1
(1996) (advising firms "to disclose the form and ramifications [of the LLP structure] to its
clients").
108. Model Rule 5.1(b) requires that a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over
another lawyer "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the
rules of professional conduct." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(b)
(1997).
109. With respect to nonlawyers employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer,
Model Rule 5.3(b) states that "a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the non-
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fers to portions of the rules which require that supervising attorneys
"make reasonable efforts to ensure" that supervised persons comply
with the rules of professional conduct. The ABA Ethics Committee
correctly points out that supervising attorneys must satisfy their ethi-
cal responsibilities for subordinates, notwithstanding any applicable
statutory shield for civil liability claims."' Although the opinion rec-
ognizes supervising attorneys' responsibilities with respect to subordi-
nates, the opinion does not mention other sections of Model Rules 5.1
and 5.3 which deal with the other responsibilities of law firm partners.
Model Rule 5.1(a) states: "A partner in a law firm shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the rules
of professional conduct.""' Under this rule, a partner can be disci-
plined for failing to ensure that the firm implements risk and quality
control measures such as conflicts checks and docket control sys-
tems." 2 If Rule 5.1(a) applies to all firm partners, a partner may not
avoid responsibility under the rule by delegating compliance matters
to another partner or administrator. 1 3 In this sense, each partner in a
law firm must make "reasonable efforts" to ensure that firm associ-
ates' and partners' conduct conforms to the applicable ethics rules.
114
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with
the professional obligations of the lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 5.3(b) (1997).
110. As stated, "[a] lawyer must satisfy his responsibilities under Rules 5.1(b) and
5.3(b) for the conduct of those he supervises, even if state law provides certain damage
limitations or exclusions for purposes of tort liability." ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note
34, at 2.
111. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(a) (1997) (emphasis added).
The official comments to Model Rule 5.1 clarify that the provisions of section (a) refer to
"lawyers who have supervisory authority over the professional work of a firm[,]... [includ-
ing] members of a partnership and the shareholders ... [of] a professional corporation."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 cmt. (1997).
112. According to the official comments to Model Rule 5.1, the propriety and ade-
quacy of measures depends on firm structure and practice. As explained, "[i]n a small
firm, informal supervision and occasional admonition ordinarily might be sufficient. In a
large firm, or in practice situations in which intensely difficult ethical problems frequently
arise, more elaborate procedures may be necessary." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr Rule 5.1 cmt. (1997). In his seminal article advocating law firm discipline, Pro-
fessor Ted Schneyer suggested that the effectiveness of Rule 5.1 in promoting an "ethical
infrastructure" varies inversely with firm size. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline
for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1991).
113. See Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner's Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms,
66 U. COLO. L. REv. 329, 356 n.129 (1995) [hereinafter Fortney, Am I My Partner's
Keeper?].
114. Professors Hazard and Hodes believe that Model Rule 5.1(a) effectively makes all
partners in a firm "supervisory" lawyers per se, and accordingly, all partners are responsi-
ble for making "reasonable efforts" to ensure compliance by members of the firm, includ-
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Model Rule 5.3(a) imposes similar responsibilities with respect to
nonlawyer assistants. This rule requires that a law firm partner "make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that the [nonlawyer's] conduct is compatible
with the professional obligations of the lawyer." ' Rather than im-
posing an affirmative duty to monitor all nonlawyer assistants, this
rule requires that firm partners make "reasonable efforts" to ensure
that the firm train and supervise nonlawyer assistants so that the
nonlawyers' conduct conforms with the ethical rules. This responsibil-
ity under 5.3(a), like the responsibility under 5.1(a), extends to all firm
partners, not just supervising attorneys.
Given that attorneys intend to rely on the LLP to shield them-
selves from vicarious civil liability for the acts and omissions of other
firm players, the ABA Ethics Opinion should have reminded attor-
neys of their obligations under Model Rules 5.1(a) as well as 5.3(a).
An attorney cannot shirk these responsibilities by hiding behind the
LLP structure. Unfortunately, the LLP structure may actually under-
mine partners' willingness to get involved in firm management and
risk management activities.
In imposing supervisory liability," 6 LLP statutes shift a dispro-
portionate share of liability to managers and supervisors. 117 To avoid
such liability, partners may avoid service as mentors, managers, and
supervisors simply because those roles could subject them to personal
liability for others' acts or omissions. 18 "The economic incentive for
ing other partners. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 55, § 5:2:101, at 778. The Illinois
version of Model Rule 5.1(a) clarifies that the provisions of the rule apply to each firm
partner. As stated, "[e]ach partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the conduct of all
lawyers in the firm conforms to these Rules." ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 5.1(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 5.3(a) (1997).
116. See infra notes 201-12 and accompanying text.
117. See Carter G. Bishop, Unincorporated Limited Liability Business Organizations:
Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 985, 1014 (1995).
See also Ribstein, supra note 28, at 330 (explaining that the supervisory liability could "give
rise to a kind of vicarious liability that is concentrated on particular partners").
118. For a more detailed discussion of how the LLP structure adversely affects attor-
neys' willingness to work with and to supervise others, see Vestal, supra note 32, at 470-77;
Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences-The
Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 717, 732-37 (1997) [here-
inafter Fortney, Seeking Shelter]. Professor Vestal explains that the extent to which the
"disincentive" to supervise results in decreased supervision depends
on a wide variety of factors in each case, such as the skill of the supervisee, the
probability of a mistake by the supervisee, the consequences of a supervisee mis-
take, the availability of firm assets to satisfy claims, the availability of insurance to
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individual LLP partners to avoid a supervisory role runs counter to a
firm's need to provide the supervision necessary to ensure quality pro-
fessional service ... "119 The remote risk of discipline for failing to
meet one's supervisory responsibilities may not effectively counter the
economic incentive to avoid supervisory responsibilities. 2 °
E. Effect of the ABA Ethics Opinion on LLPs
As illustrated above, the ABA Ethics Opinion does not mention
certain Model Rules implicated by practice in limited liability law
firms. Those rules covered in the opinion receive cursory treatment.
Unfortunately, the ABA Committee reaches conclusions on LLP
practice without explaining the rationale or support for its position. A
few ethics scholars have expressed similar concerns about the quality
of ethics opinions. In a 1991 article, Professors Ted Finman and Theo-
dore Schneyer evaluated opinions issued by the ABA Ethics Commit-
tee, concluding that the "opinions are seriously flawed, so much so
that their overall influence may well be unfortunate.' 12' To reach this
cover supervisee-based claims, the relationship with the client, and the difficulties
of proof involved in making the claim, and others.
Vestal, supra note 32, at 475.
119. Jennifer J. Johnson, The Oregon Limited Liability Partnership Act, 32 WILLAM-
ETTE L. REV. 147, 169-70 (1996) [hereinafter Johnson, Oregon LLP Act]. The recently
adopted amendments to the New York disciplinary rules imposing firm discipline clarify
that supervision is both an individual and collective responsibility. See The Comm. on
Professional Responsibility of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on
Discipline of Law Firms 19 (May 1993) (on file with the South Texas Law Review). As
provided in § 1200.5(c), "[a] law firm shall adequately supervise, as appropriate, the work
of partners, associates and nonlaywers who work at the firm." Joint Order of the Appel-
late Divisions of the Supreme Court (May 22, 1996) (on file with the South Texas Law
Review). Professor Schneyer, the author of the seminal article recommending firm disci-
pline, has suggested that the amended New York rules may "counterbalance" the effect of
LLP attorneys being wary of supervisory roles within firms. See New York Adopts New
Rules Subjecting Firms to Discipline, 12 LAws. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 191,
193-94 (June 12, 1996) (quoting Professor Schneyer's presentation at the 22nd National
Conference on Professional Responsibility). Professor Schneyer believes that limited lia-
bility status may actually cause principals with supervisory liability to "fortify [the firm's]
internal controls." Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections of How Law Influ-
ences the "Ethical Intrastructure" of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 275 (1998).
120. "As a precondition to assuming supervisory responsibility.... LLP partners may
insist that the partnership agreement require both indemnification by the firm and contri-
bution by each LLP partner." Johnson, Oregon LLP Act, supra note 119, at 172. For a
discussion of the wisdom of inter partner contribution in LLPs, see Simeon Gold, Limited
Liability Partnerships and Inter-Partner Contribution, 121 N.Y. L.J. 1, 4, 27 (1994).
121. Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of the Bar Association Ethics Opin-
ions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 72 (1981). After discussing
the role that ethics opinions play in self-governance and analyzing formal ethics opinions,
the authors made excellent recommendations for improving the quality of ABA ethics
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conclusion, they analyzed both the reasoning and holdings in twenty-
one ABA opinions issued since the ABA adopted the Model Code. 2
In evaluating the ABA Ethics Committee's reasoning, the authors
asked whether the opinions possessed the following attributes: identi-
fication of a tenable, rule-based rationale;' 23 identification of relevant
authorities;124 identification and analysis of problems of interpretative
choice125 ; and clarity.'
26
Applying these criteria, the ABA Ethics Opinion on LLPs ap-
pears to be lacking in a number of respects. First, the opinion fails to
provide tenable rationale and authority for its conclusions. 1 27 For ex-
ample, the opinion does not cite relevant authority for the conclusion
that business form is unimportant to clients and that initials ade-
quately inform clients as to the limitation on liability. Second, the
opinion does not recognize problems of interpretative choice in dis-
cussing the applicability of the limitation on liability. Instead, the
opinion simply concludes that the prohibition on prospective limits on
opinions, most notably the adoption of adversarial procedures. See id. at 145-63. The
authors conclude by stating that the entire enterprise could profitably be abandoned "[i]f
no reforms are instituted or if reforms prove unavailing." Id. at 167. They end the article
by stating, "Half a loaf may be better than none, but halfway analysis by a body that shapes
the conduct of lawyers and the decisions of Code enforcers is not." Id. In a recent article
updating the Finman-Schneyer critique, Professor Lawrence K. Hellman joined the call for
improving the quality of the ABA ethics opinions. See Lawrence K. Hellman, When "Eth-
ics Rules" Don't Mean What They Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions,
10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 317, 336 (1996).
122. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 121, at 92 (noting that the ABA Ethics Com-
mittee presumably prepares formal opinions with greater effort and care than the commit-
tee uses in preparing informal opinions).
123. The tenable rationale test requires that the opinion refer to the disciplinary sec-
tion that supports the holding for which it is cited. See id. at 95.
124. An opinion should identify both relevant disciplinary provisions, as well as perti-
nent earlier opinions. See id. "[A]n opinion [that] does not mention a significant rule or
opinion ... clearly fails this [identification of relevant authority] test." Id.
125. Problems of interpretative choice arise when disciplinary provisions seem to com-
pel conflicting results or when disciplinary provisions appear to be ambiguous. See id. at
96.
126. Because the Model Code includes both aspirational ethical considerations (ECs)
as well as legally binding disciplinary rules (DRs), an opinion should clarify whether it is
based on ECs or DRs. See id.
127. Although the ABA Ethics Opinion on LLPs refers to criteria articulated in an
earlier opinion on PCs, the opinion does not discuss other opinions related to associations
and networks of attorneys. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 94-338 (1994) (noting that "[w]ords like 'affiliated,' 'associated,' 'corre-
spondent,' or 'network,' without further explanation, can be misleading and, therefore, use
of these terms, without a meaningful description of the nature of the relationship, violates
Model Rule 7.1"). Furthermore, the opinion fails to mention the applicability of Model
Rules 1.4, 1.7, 5.1(a) and 5.3(a) to LLPs. See supra notes 90-98, 111-15 and accompanying
text.
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liability does not apply to the statutory shield for vicarious liability.
Similarly, the ABA Ethics Committee, as an aside, notes that the use
of abbreviations satisfies the requirement of Model Rules 7.1 and
7.5(a) that a lawyer's public communications not be "misleading" or
"deceptive." The committee reasons that LLPs "are indeed partner-
ships, and thus there is no actual or implied misrepresentation when a
firm describes itself as such.' 128 This conclusion completely ignores
the potential for confusion created by an LLP firm that looks and op-
erates like a traditional partnership.129 To achieve clarity, the ABA
LLP opinion resorts to what Professor Charles W. Wolfram character-
ized as "strong statement, rather than flawless reasoning.'
130
Despite the apparent flaws in the ABA opinion, it will still wield
considerable influence. In discussing the significance of ethics opin-
ions as one of the components of lawyer self-governance, Professors
Finman and Schneyer examined various ways in which the ethics opin-
ions exert influence by interpreting applicable rules for attorneys and
persons who enforce the applicable rules.13' "In shaping enforcers'
Code interpretations, [ethics] opinions obviously protect lawyers
whose behavior is permitted under those interpretations."'1 32 As indi-
cated by the articles that have already cited the ABA Ethics Opinion
on LLPs, the ABA Ethics Opinion will be relied on by attorneys look-
ing for guidance as to the applicability of the disciplinary rules to prac-
128. ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 2. Under Model Rule 7.5(d), "[l]awyers
may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that
is the fact." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.5(d) (1997).
129. The composition of the ABA Ethics Committee and the bias of committee mem-
bers may have contributed to the committee's apparent willingness to jump to conclusions.
Seven of the ten committee members who issued the LLP opinion are affiliated with law
firms. See ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 1; MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREC-
TORY NJ628B, NJ630B, C0166B, C0167B, PA439B, PA440B, DC888B, DC890B,
OH350B, DC236B, DC237B (1997). Of these seven committee members, five are mem-
bers of law firms and two hold "of counsel" or "advisory counsel" positions. Of the seven
law firms with which committee members are associated, six firms have more than one
office, with four firms operating on a multi-state basis. Perhaps the committee would have
reached different conclusions had it not been dominated by large firm lawyers or had it
included nonlawyers. Over fifteen years ago, Professors Finman and Schneyer voiced a
similar criticism, noting that the ABA Committee "consists exclusively of lawyers, and
nearly exclusively of lawyers from the most prestigious level of the profession." Finman &
Schneyer, supra note 121, at 151.
130. WOLFRAM, supra note 66, at 66.
131. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 121, at 74-88.
132. Id. at 88. "Even when lawyers look to enforcement decisions for guidance, ethics
opinions may be playing a significant role, since the enforcement decision itself may have
been shaped by a prior ethics opinion." Id. at 81.
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tice in LLPs.' 133 The ethics opinions on LLPs coupled with the
widespread use of the LLP structure by attorneys will provide attor-
neys a kind of safe harbor in the unlikely event that enforcement offi-
cials assert that practice in an LLP violates one or more disciplinary
rules.
If a dispute involving an LLP law firm makes it to court, the ABA
Ethics Opinion on LLPs and state ethics opinions could easily influ-
ence the court. A study of state and federal court decisions citing bar
ethics opinions from 1924 to 1990 revealed that courts have frequently
relied on ethics opinions in deciding cases involving legal ethics is-
sues.13 4 The majority of cases surveyed treated the ABA ethics opin-
ions with great deference, 35 notwithstanding the advisory nature of
the opinions.' 36 Although the ABA and state ethics opinions only ap-
ply disciplinary rules, the opinions may influence jurists in deciding
professional malpractice cases. 37 For example, in a malpractice case
where the plaintiff alleges that the LLP initials did not clearly disclose
133. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 97, at 11-12; Marci A. Reddick & David C. Worrell,
Amending Rule 27: Proposal I Makes Sense for the Bar and the Public, RES GESTAE, Mar.
1997, at 7, 7-9.
134. Using information collected from a computerized survey, Professor Jorge L. Carro
analyzed the data on a quantitative and qualitative basis. The quantitative analysis re-
vealed "a substantial number of cases reported by both federal and state courts, at various
levels, that cited bar ethics opinions." Carro, supra note 33, at 23.
135. See id. (explaining that the qualitative analysis of ethics opinions attempts to mea-
sure the degree of reliance that courts have displayed when referring to ethics opinions).
136. Following a Department of Justice antitrust suit against the ABA alleging prac-
tices constituting restraints of trade, the ABA Ethics Committee announced that the Code
of Professional Responsibility and its ethics opinions regarding advertising would not bind
any individual lawyer. See id. at 15. The ABA Ethics Committee explained the advisory
nature of its opinions in a 1978 informal opinion, stating that the "opinions of the Commit-
tee are undertaken as faithful interpretations of the Code with respect to professional stan-
dards and obligations, they are issued in response to a request for advice, and there is no
backup machinery, so to speak, for enforcement or effectuation of such advice." ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1420 (1978). For criticism
of the non-binding character of the ethics opinions and the procedures of the ethics com-
mittee, see Whitney A. McCaslin, Note, Empowering Ethics Committees, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 959, 978-80 (1996).
137. Various opinions in legal malpractice cases rely on ethics opinions. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Fine, Olin & Anderson, P.C., 642 N.Y.S.2d 819, 821 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (referring
to a New York State Bar Association Committee ethics opinion dealing with the limits on
the scope of representation); Walden v. Hoke, 429 S.E.2d 504, 509 (W. Va. 1993) (agreeing
with the opinion of the West Virginia Bar's Committee on Legal Ethics which concluded
that lawyers could not represent a husband and wife in divorce proceedings). But see Rice
v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1287 & n.8 (Ind. 1996) (disagreeing with a formal ABA ethics
opinion which concluded that attorneys for a partnership do not have an attorney-client
relationship with each of the general partners). An expert witness could refer to ethics
opinions in opining on whether a defendant-attorney's conduct comported with the stan-
dard of care. See 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
426 SOUTH TExAs LAw REVIEW [Vol. 39:399
the limitation on liability, a court may rely on the ABA opinion's con-
clusion that initials are adequate.
This leads to the most detrimental effect of leading attorneys to
believe that they are out of the ethical woods. Although the ABA
Ethics Opinion on LLPs clearly states that it is limited to compliance
with the Model Rules, 138 attorneys may interpret the ABA Ethics
Opinion as an approval of practice in limited liability firms. Such an
interpretation can hurt attorneys if they fail to recognize the advisory
nature of ethics opinions and the fact that the opinions do not address
professional liability questions. Therefore, law firm partners should
not assume that compliance with the minimum standards of the ABA
Ethics Opinion or state ethics opinions will mean that they will be
protected from vicarious tort liability. 139 In those states where the
supreme court has not approved practice in limited liability firms,140
the future of limited liability law firms remains very uncertain. 4 ' The
following survey of professional liability issues illuminates some un-
resolved professional responsibility questions related to limited liabil-
ity law partnerships.
§ 18.7, at 582-83 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing different judicial approaches to allowing ethical
standards to be used in legal malpractice litigation).
138. "This opinion.., does not purport to examine the controlling law of the 50 states
or other relevant jurisdictions but rather is limited to compliance with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct." ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 34, at 3.
139. In opining that the use of the LLP initials "is adequate to meet ethical criteria,"
the ABA Ethics Opinion reminded attorneys that "(t]he committee cannot and does not
express any opinion as to whether, as a matter of law, the use of initials is sufficient to
shield the partners of a lawyer held liable for malpractice from vicarious tort liability." Id.
at 2.
140. Some state supreme courts have adopted rules allowing attorneys to practice in
LLPs, subject to certain conditions. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE AN., Gov. BAR R. III, § 4
(Anderson 1997) (requiring "adequate professional liability insurance or other form of ad-
equate financial responsibility"); MASS. Cr. R. 3:06(3)(b) (1995) (requiring professional
liability insurance or the segregation of funds in a designated amount determined by the
number of attorneys, not to exceed $500,000).
141. Commentators have recognized the uncertain future of LLPs. See, e.g., Mallen,
supra note 78, at 1073 (warning attorneys that "the liability protections afforded by LLP's
are uncertain"); Terrence A. Oved, New York State Limited Liability Partnerships, N.Y. ST.
B.J., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 38, 41 (explaining that the "lack of precedent creates uncer-
tainty"). One commentator has even suggested that the uncertainty is beneficial in causing
firm partners to carry adequate levels of insurance so that they do not rely on the uncertain
shield to their detriment. See Carol R. Goforth, Limiting the Liability of General Partners
in LLPs: An Analysis of Statutory Alternatives, 75 OR. L. REV. 1139, 1215 (1996). The New
Mexico Ethics Opinion on LLPs cautions attorneys by stating that "neither the legislature
nor the [state] Supreme Court has provided explicit legal authority for lawyers to practice
in the Registered LLP form. Accordingly, lawyers who opt to practice through a Regis-
tered LLP must assess the legal risks which inhere in that choice." New Mexico State Bar
Advisory Opinions Comm., Op. 1996-1, at 10 (1996).
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III. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ISSUES
A. Uncertainties Related to Courts' Recognition of the Liability
Shield
Professional liability questions will depend on how courts ap-
proach and interpret the statutory shield against vicarious liability.
142
Malpractice plaintiffs could attack the statutory limit of liability, 143 as-
sert that the shield does not apply to the alleged claims because the
firm did not comply with statutory prerequisites for LLP status, 44 or
plead around the shield.' 45 Even in those states where LLP legislation
expressly allows attorneys to use the LLP form, 4 6 the courts can re-
ject the statutory limit on vicarious liability by exercising the courts'
inherent authority to regulate the legal profession. 47 Some commen-
tators in referring to reported cases involving PCs have suggested that
142. Professors Bromberg and Ribstein acknowledge that the LLP approach to "com-
bining limited liability with provisions designed for personally liable members may make
the courts' job of interpreting and filling gaps in the statute and the parties' agreement
more difficult." BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, § 1.03(c), at 20-21.
143. For a discussion of issues related to allowing attorneys to limit their liability and
externalize their costs, see id. § 3.01, at 111-18; Fortney, Seeking Shelter, supra note 118, at
751-57.
144. Statutory prerequisites may include maintaining insurance, registering annually,
and using the appropriate partnership name. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20,
§ 2.09(a), at 77-78 (referring to sections in the treatise discussing these statutory
prerequisites).
145. For example, a malpractice plaintiff might allege contract claims rather than tort
claims in an attempt to avoid the LLP protection under statutes that only cover tort-type
claims. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3431 (West Supp. 1996) (limiting the liability shield to
"liabilities and obligations of the partnership arising from errors, omissions, negligence,
incompetence, malfeasance, or willful or intentional misconduct committed in the course of
the partnership business by another partner or a representative of the partnership"). Re-
ferring to similar language in the original Texas LLP statute, Professor Alan Bromberg
explained, "The statutory words have a distinct torts flavor and appear not to cover any
contractual liability. Plaintiffs will probably try to plead their cases in ways to avoid the
statutory words." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (Source and Comments of
Alan R. Bromberg-1991 Amendments) (Vernon Supp. 1997). Recently, the Texas Legis-
lature extended the liability shield to cover all "debts and obligations of the partnership
incurred while the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership." Act of May 13,
1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 375 § 113, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6 (Vernon) (to be codified as
an amendment to TEX. REV. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 6132b-3.08).
146. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-147 (Supp. 1996) (allowing a partnership en-
gaged in rendering professional services to register as an LLP subject to the laws and regu-
lations governing the professional and other terms and conditions imposed by the
professional licensing authority).
147. For a thoughtful analysis of whether courts will rely on the inherent powers doc-
trine "to rein in the LLP legislation so as to assure protection for clients," see Wolfram,
supra note 64, at 373-82, 402. See also Debra L. Thill, Comment, The Inherent Powers
Doctrine and Regulation of the Practice of Law: Will Minnesota Attorneys Practicing in
Professional Corporations or Limited Liability Companies Be Denied the Benefit of Statu-
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the courts will uphold the LLP liability shield. 48 Such a prediction
based on professional corporation cases does not recognize the differ-
ences between a firm practicing as a PC and a firm practicing as an
LLP.149 On a conceptual level, a court could reject the liability shield,
concluding that as a matter of professional responsibility, partners in a
partnership should remain jointly and severally liable for acts and
omissions by firm actors.
The recent debate over section 79 of the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers (Restatement) illustrates different per-
spectives on whether the courts should hold law firm principals jointly
and severally liable, regardless of firm structure. As first proposed,
section 79 of the Restatement imposed vicarious civil liability on firm
principals based on the principles of respondeat superior and enter-
prise liability. 150 As stated, "[a] law firm [and each of its principals] is
subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by any
wrongful act or omission of any principal or employee of the firm who
was acting in the ordinary course of the firm's business or with actual
tory Liability Shields?, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1163-70 (1994) (discussing the
court's use of inherent powers to invalidate the liability shield for attorneys).
148. See, e.g., LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 91:351, 91:363 (June 25,
1997) ("[T]he modern view seems to be swinging away from rigid imposition of vicarious
liability."). In referring to "[the] scant appellate case law on the issue of whether lawyers
may take advantage of the limited liability provisions of LLCs and LLPs," the commentary
suggests that "the same policy considerations that come into play when analyzing the pro-
priety of limited liability PCs would also seem to be persuasive when analyzing LLCs and
LLPs." Id. at 367.
149. PCs differ from LLPs in a number of respects. The key difference between a PC
and an LLP is that the LLP operates as a partnership, while the PC must function as a
corporation. PCs, unlike LLPs, must observe corporate formalities such as election of of-
ficers and directors and maintenance of corporate records. Failure to observe these for-
malities can lead to the piercing of the corporate veil. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY HELD CORPO-
RATIONS § 7.9 (1996) (considering how the veil piercing concept could apply to LLPs).
Unlike LLP legislation which was enacted to provide professional limited liability pro-
tection, states first enacted PC statutes to allow professionals to take advantage of tax
benefits available to corporate shareholders. See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 137,
§ 5.4, at 272 (explaining that the original interest in PCs "stemmed primarily from the
desire to secure preferential tax advantages").
Federal income tax laws deter large firms from incorporating because PCs with over
35 shareholders will be subject to double taxation. See Simpson, supra note 17, at Bll.
With LLPs, firm size does not affect taxation. As a result, large firms can function as LLPs
without adverse tax consequences. In smaller firms, supervision and monitoring takes
place on an informal basis. See Dzienkowski, supra note 82, at 976-77 (describing the
differences between practice in large firms and small firms). As compared to the LLP
structure, the PC structure appears to provide clients more protection.
150. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 cmt. b (Ten-
tative Draft No. 7, 1994).
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authority.' 151 After some American Law Institute (ALI) members
objected to the proposed language, asserting that it did not take into
account state statutes and cases supporting limited -liability and re-
flected a "policy bias" rather than restating the law, 5 2 the ALI mem-
bers rejected this proposed .section, asking the reporters to revise the
section and comments to take into account legislation allowing attor-
neys to limit their liability.'53 At a May 1997 meeting, the ALI mem-
bers approved the reformulated version of section 79 which deals
separately with the vicarious liability of partners in general partner-
ships and principals using other law firm structures.5 4 Under the ap-
proved section of the Restatement, "A principal of a law firm
organized other than as a general partnership as authorized by law is
vicariously liable for the acts of another principal or employee of the
firm to the extent provided by law."' 55 In referring to the state legisla-
tion that allows lawyers to practice in PCs, LLPs, and LLCs, the com-
mentary following section 79 states that the effect of such statutory
language on lawyers may be limited by the state supreme courts' rules
and by statutory provisions concerning professional regulation. 56 As
adopted, section 79 provides little guidance to courts struggling with
the limited liability issue.
157
151. Id. § 79(1).
152. For a discussion of the opposition to the original version of section 79, see Several
Restatement Sections Receive Cool Response from ALl, 10 LAws. MAN. ON PROF. CON-
DUcr (ABA/BNA) 9, 139 (June 1, 1994) (referring to complaints lodged by ALI members
including Robert O'Malley, Loss Prevention Counsel of the Attorneys' Liability Assurance
Society, Inc., a malpractice carrier insuring many of the nation's largest firms). Professor
Leubsdorf, one of the Restatement's reporters, responded to the objections by explaining
that in only about one-third of the jurisdictions with limited liability statutes have the
courts actually ruled on the limitation of liability issues, with just two or three states favor-
ing unqualified limitation, another seven permitting it with certain conditions, and seven
imposing vicarious liability. See id. at 141.
153. See id.
154. See ALl Wraps Up Product Liability Project, New UCC Article on Licenses Makes
Debut, 65 U.S. L. WK. 2777, 2782 (1997) (explaining that the ALI members who opposed
the original version of section 79 "complained that the section took an extreme position
embracing vicarious liability ... and failing to recognize the impact of state laws that per-
mit lawyers to limit or eliminate such liability").
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79(3) (Tentative
Draft No. 8, 1997) (emphasis added). After setting forth the civil liability of a law firm,
section 79 covers the vicarious liability of firm principals in two subsections. Subsection (2)
restates the liability of partners in a general partnership as follows: "Each of the principals
of a law firm organized as a general partnership is liable jointly and severally with the
firm." Id. § 79(2). Subsection (3) then defers to applicable law in covering the vicarious
liability of firm principals using other types of law firm organizations. See id. § 79(3).
156. See id. § 79 cmt. c.
157. In imposing vicarious liability on firm principals, a court could refer to the com-
ments under section 79 which explain how vicarious liability helps maintain the quality of
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Although a court may make a policy determination on vicarious
liability of lawyers practicing in LLPs, the particular controversy be-
tween the litigants will probably affect a court's decision. A survey of
possible claims indicates that the court's treatment of the liability
shield and the outcome of the case may turn on the facts, allegations,
and lawyering in a particular case.
B. Plaintiffs' Claims Based on Common Law Theories and
Equitable Principles
The law firm structure at the time the client retained legal serv-
ices could affect plaintiffs' claims. If the firm operated as a general
partnership when the attorney-client relationship commenced, the
plaintiff could allege a breach of fiduciary duty if the law firm failed to
disclose the effect of the firm converting to an LLP. "As a fiduciary,
an attorney is obligated to render a full and fair disclosure of facts
material to the client's representation." '158 According to legal mal-
practice experts Ronald Mallen and Jeffrey Smith, "the disclosure
must include not only all material facts, but also should include an
explanation of their legal significance.' 1 59 Conversion from a general
partnership, in which partners share unlimited liability, to an LLP
structure, in which partners are no longer jointly and severally liable,
poses both financial and quality control risks to clients. The joint and
several liability feature of a general partnership protects clients in two
ways. First, it provides incentives for partners to monitor the quality
legal services and helps assure compensation to those who may have claims against princi-
pals of a firm. See id. § 79 cmt. b. On the other hand, a court inclined to recognize the
limits on vicarious liability might be influenced by another comment which states that "lim-
ited liability is a principle generally accepted for those engaged in gainful occupations." Id.
158. Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988). The introductory note to
Chapter Two of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes the
unique fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship. As stated:
A lawyer is a fiduciary agent, to whom clients entrust matters, property, and in-
formation, which may be of great importance and sensitivity, and whose work is
usually not subject to detailed client supervision because of its complexity. Be-
cause those characteristics of the client-lawyer relationship make clients vulnera-
ble to harm, and because of the importance to the legal system of faithful
representation, the law stated in this Chapter provides a number of safeguards for
clients beyond those generally provided to principals.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Introduction to Chapter 2
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
159. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 137, § 14.17, at 286. "Essential to the attorney's
fiduciary obligations of undivided loyalty and confidentiality is the responsibility to
promptly advise the client of any important information that may impinge on those obliga-
tions." Id. (citations omitted).
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of legal services."' Second, holding partners jointly and severally lia-
ble maximizes clients' recovery in the malpractice actions.16' There-
fore, clients who retained a general partnership firm are entitled to
know that the firm no longer operates on an "all for one, one for all"
basis. A client who establishes a breach of fiduciary duty may be enti-
tled to fee forfeiture even where the client has suffered no loss as a
result of the attorney's misconduct.' 62
A legal malpractice plaintiff will face a more difficult challenge if
the defendant firm operated as an LLP at the time when the plaintiff
first retained the firm.163 Such a plaintiff may still try to bust the LLP
shield by alleging that the limit on vicarious liability creates a conflict
of interest that firm attorneys must disclose. In forming the attorney-
client relationship, a lawyer should "consult with the client about such
matters as the benefits and disadvantages of the proposed representa-
tion and conflicts of interest."'"' At the commencement of the attor-
160. In describing malpractice control measures as "institutional measures," Professor
John Leubsdorf convincingly argues that vicarious liability "ensures that partners will insti-
tute such measures ... [and that] once instituted, [the measures] will receive more than lip
service." John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS
L. REv. 101, 143 (1995). The comments to the adopted version of section 79 of the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers reflect this view by stating that vicarious lia-
bility helps "maintain the quality of legal services, by requiring not only a firm but also its
principals to stand behind the performance of other firm personnel." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997).
161. "The thin capitalization of many firms makes vicarious liability important to en-
sure internalization of the full costs of malpractice." Leubsdorf, supra note 160, at 142.
For an analysis of the externalization risk posed by thinly capitalized LLP firms, see Fort-
ney, Seeking Shelter, supra note 118, at 751-757.
162. See Thomas D. Morgan, Sanctions and Remedies for Attorney Misconduct, 19 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 343, 351 (1995). Recently, in a case of first impression, the Texas Supreme
Court recognized fee forfeiture as a remedy for breach of an attorney's fiduciary duty,
regardless of damage or causation. See Arce v. Burrow, No. 14-95-00360-CV, 1997 WL
528389, at *4 (Tex. .App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958)). "Courts have reached differing results on the question of
whether to impose fee forfeitures for ethical violations." Fee Forfeiture May Be Imposed
for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Without Showing of Causation or Damages, PROF. LIABILITY
REP., Oct. 1997, at 352, 352-53.
163. Normally, an attorney's fiduciary obligations are predicated on an attorney-client
relationship. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 137, § 14.1, at 232 (noting that the "re-
sponsibilities of the fiduciary obligations and correlative disabilities usually do not burden
attorneys in their everyday affairs, but only when they act in a professional capacity or
otherwise use the integrity of their office in a relationship"). Fiduciary responsibilities may
arise when an attorney discusses legal problems with a prospective client. See Nolan v.
Foreman, 665 F.2d 738, 739 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that under Texas law "[t]he fiduci-
ary relationship between an attorney and his client extends even to preliminary consulta-
tions between the client and the attorney regarding the attorney's possible retention").
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. c (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
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ney-client relationship the interests of the firm principals in limiting
their liability potentially conflicts with the interests of the client in
unlimited liability of firm principals in the event of a malpractice
claim.165 To recover in a malpractice action, the client must prove that
the conflicting interest prevented the attorney from providing compe-
tent representation, proximately causing the client's injury.' 66 Such a
showing may be difficult to make in a case where the only conflicting
interest is the limitation on vicarious liability.
Depending on the facts, aggrieved clients could assert construc-
tive fraud claims.1 67 In the context of an attorney-client relationship,
the Texas Supreme Court in Archer v. Griffith defined constructive
fraud as "the breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespec-
tive of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency
to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public inter-
ests."' 68 In fashioning a constructive fraud claim, a plaintiff could al-
lege that the LLP structure is inherently misleading. As discussed in
Part I, the majority of laypeople probably do not understand the
unintelligible initials at the end of a firm name.' 69 Moreover, clients
may actually be confused by the LLP structure.'70 Professors Alan R.
Bromberg and Larry E. Ribstein acknowledge "the potential for con-
fusing clients" as "[o]ne reason for refusing to permit professional
165. When there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client
would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interest or by the lawyer's
duties to others, ethics rules require that attorneys obtain the prospective client's informed
consent. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1997) (stating that
"[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities ... unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consulta-
tion." See also Model Rule 1.8 which classifies "agreement[s] prospectively limiting...
liability" as a conflict of interest. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.8(h)
(1997).
166. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 137, § 15.18, at 395.
167. "Constructive fraud reposes exclusively in [attorneys'] fiduciary obligations and
simply is a characterization of a breach of such a duty." 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note
137, § 8.10, at 599-600 (citations omitted).
168. 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. 1964). According to the Texas Supreme Court, a pre-
sumption of unfairness or invalidity attaches to a contract entered into while the attorney-
client relationship existed. See id. at 739. Because the attorney failed to show that the
contract was reasonable, the court set aside the contingency fee agreement, stating that
under the facts, the agreement was "so unfair and unreasonable that a court of equity
should intervene and set the [agreement] aside." Id. at 740.
169. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
170. In seeking "comment on the ways to properly advise clients of the correct status
of the organizational structure providing representation," the Indiana Supreme Court ex-
pressed concern that "some clients may not understand fully the status of limited liability
corporations or partnerships." Comment Sought Re: The Practice of Law as LLC, LLP,
RES GESTAE, Feb. 1997, at 7, 7.
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firms to practice as LLPs while permitting firms to practice as other
types of limited liability entities."'' As revealed by Internet discus-
sions, even "lawyers creating LLPs for themselves were well aware
that there was a real risk that what they were doing was misleading
and [they] were struggling to say enough to avoid claims of fraud-but
not to say too much."'
1 72
At a minimum, firm partners should inform clients of the firm's
limited liability structure. A few LLP statutes expressly eliminate the
liability protection for partners who contract without using the re-
quired name unless the partners "can show that the third party did not
rely on the firm's being a general partnership.' 73 Under common law
principles, the failure to place clients on notice could result in the firm
losing the LLP shield because in appropriate cases limited liability sta-
tus "[may] not be raised against injured parties who were not made
aware of, or could not have known of, the limited liability nature of
the entity.' 74 A firm could improve the chances of a court recogniz-
ing the LLP shield by consistently using the words "limited liability
partnership" rather than relying on abbreviations.' 75 Plain language
171. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, § 7.04(a), at 251-52 ("Unsophisticated
third parties may not understand that LLP partners, unlike those in other general partner-
ships, have limited liability for misconduct-type claims."). "The standard 'LLP' designa-
tion required by the LLP statutes... may not go far enough to dispel this confusion." Id.
§ 7.04(a), at 252 (citations omitted). Referring to LLP statutes that limit liability for negli-
gence and similar misconduct, Professor Carol Goforth believes that the "risk of confusing
even sophisticated business persons seems substantial." Goforth, supra note 141, at 1180.
If people are being fooled by inadequate disclosure, Professor Ribstein suggests regulating
disclosure rather than imposing general restrictions on the availability of limited liability.
See Hamilton & Ribstein, supra note 88, at 703.
172. Hamilton & Ribstein supra note 88, at 712.
173. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, § 2.05, at 63 (referring to the Alabama,
Florida, Minnesota, and North Dakota statutes). In other states the consequences of not
using the required name "are uncertain." Id.
174. Marquis, supra note 6, at 702. See, e.g., Smith v. Style Adver., Inc., 470 So. 2d
1194, 1196 (Ala. 1985) (holding that limited partnership and its general partners are liable
for advertising services performed by plaintiff because no evidence indicated that plaintiff
was informed of corporate status); Philipp Lithographing Co. v. Babich, 135 N.W.2d 343,
344 (Wis. 1965) ("[P]artners who continue to hold themselves out as such after the forma-
tion of a corporation cannot escape responsibility for contracts entered into after the
change in business status without adequate notice that the partnership has been dis-
solved."); Hill & Co. v. O'Malley, 817 P.2d 660, 663 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) ("[A] corporate
director or officer cannot escape personal liability under a contract entered into with third
persons on behalf of the corporation if the third person is unaware of the corporation's
existence and the directors or officers failed to disclose its existence.").
175. "Consistent use of the legal name, including the designator required by the stat-
ute, should minimize opportunities available for third parties to argue (i) they did not have
notice the partnership had become an LLP or (ii) their sources for recovery on claims
against the partnership include the assets of general partners." Robert R. Keatinge et al.,
Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Step in the Evolution of the Unincorporated Busi-
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disclosure of the effect of LLP status should avoid claims based on
lack of notice.
176
Clients represented by a firm prior to LLP registration could eas-
ily challenge notice.' 77 Those clients could seek to hold all partners
personally liable, arguing that the liability arose out of the single en-
gagement agreement entered prior to the LLP registration. 78 The
Minnesota statute expressly adopts this view stating that "[a]ll part-
nership debts and obligations under or relating to a note, contract, or
other agreement arise and accrue when the note, contract, or other
agreement is entered into."'1 79 Absent an express statutory provision
dealing with preregistration contracts and post-registration liabilities,
a court could still conclude that partners' liability for contractual
claims arose when the contract was made, not when the breach oc-
curred. 180 For other claims, a court could compare the LLP registra-
tion to partnership dissolution and "require notice to prior clients just
as a dissolving partnership must give actual or constructive notice to
pre-existing creditors in order to limit post-dissolution liabilities.' 81
ness Organization, 51 Bus. LAW. 147, 171 (1995) [hereinafter Keatinge et al., Limited Lia-
bility Partnerships].
176. See Dzienkowski, supra note 82, at 985 n.82 (suggesting that states require a lim-
ited liability firm "to disclose in plain language the effect of the state law on the client's
ability to bring an action against the firm in the future").
177. For a concise discussion of timing questions, see Keatinge et al., Limited Liability
Partnerships, supra note 175, at 185-86. "[I]f a partnership enters into a professional rela-
tionship with a client before registering and, after registration, commits an error or omis-
sion, the client might be able to argue the partnership has violated an obligation it
undertook prior to registration .... " Id. at 186.
178. "Clients of professional firms have a particularly strong argument for notice based
on the theory that all of their dealings arise out of a single engagement agreement that
began prior to the [LLP] registration." BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, § 3.11(c),
at 150.
179. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(6) (West Supp. 1997). Compare the Maryland statute
which provides that the liability limitation shall not affect
[t]he liability of a partner for debts and obligations of the partnership, whether in
contract or in tort, that arise from or relate to a contract made by the partnership
prior to its registration as a limited liability partnership, unless the registration
was consented to in writing by the party to the contract that is seeking to enforce
the debt or obligation.
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS. § 9-307(C)(3) (Supp. 1996).
180. See Bishop, supra note 117, at 1010 (distinguishing a partner's liability for tort
claims which will depend on when the liability "arose"). The comment to the Uniform
Limited Liability Partnership Act § 306(c) "focus[es] on the reasonable expectations of
contracting parties to determine when obligation incurred." Id. at 1010 n.113.
181. LARRY E. RIaSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS EN-rTIEs 339 (1996) (referring
to section 35 of the Uniform Partnership Act and to Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42,
45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), where the court concluded that a client who did not receive notice
of dissociation could hold a law partner liable for the negligent act of the partnership or its
partners).
1998] PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LABILITY ISSUES 435
Therefore, clients who engaged firms prior to LLP registration may be
able to hold all firm partners personally liable for malpractice claims if
firms do not provide notice." 2 To avoid such claims and to minimize
partners' liability exposure, firms should not rely on simple announce-
ments advising clients of the firm's name change. 83 Instead, firms
should fully inform clients of the nature and consequences of the re-
gistration and give clients an opportunity to withdraw.'84 Clients who
want to hold firm partners vicariously liable can seek other counsel. 5
Despite the fact that disclosure can help preserve the statutory
limit on vicarious liability and defend against various malpractice
claims, firms resist making such disclosure. Apparently, firm attor-
neys believe that such disclosure will create a wall between them and
their clients, or even worse, cause the clients to find other counsel.' 86
"Some firms simply believe that it's unsatisfactory for them to tell
their clients as they walk in the door that there's a limit on their part-
182. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, § 3.11(c), at 150.
183. One author suggests that "cautious" law firms seriously consider:
(a) sending an announcement to, at a minimum, each of its current clients, advis-
ing them of the change in firm name (e.g., "[e]ffective Nov. 1, 1994, this firm will
be known as 'Able, Baker & Charlie, R.L.L.P."') and (b) being prepared to an-
swer all client inquiries concerning the implications of the change, preferably in
writing (or based on a written script) to avoid disputes later on as to what was
said.
Krane, supra note 60, at 8. Perhaps such an announcement which does not explain the
significance of the LLP designation can lead clients to believe that only the firm's name has
changed.
184. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, § 3.11(c), at 150. Professors Brom-
berg and Ribstein caution that the duty to inform clients raises "many questions," includ-
ing whether the standard of informed consent compares to consents to conflicts of interest.
See id. at 151. They indicate that the "information would probably have to include at least
a description of the partners' former personal liability and a description of the matters
(perhaps excluding current cases) that are subject to the liability limitation." Id. Once a
firm makes this disclosure in writing, a client's retention of the firm could be treated as
consent. Firms should retain a copy of the written disclosure in the firm's permanent
records as part of the firm's "burden of proof" file.
185. By providing clients an opportunity to retain other counsel, firms honor the
agency nature of the attorney-client relationship "grounded in mutual consent." See
Charles Silver, The Legal Establishment Meets the Republican Revolution, 37 S. TEX. L.
REV. 1247, 1248 (1996) (applying agency principles to the privity debate).
186. As posed by one commentator: "[W]ill clients perceive the move as an attempt by
firms to supervise their lawyers less and evade responsibility for shoddy work?" Lisa Isom-
Rodriguez, Limiting the Perils of Partnership, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1993, at 30, 30.
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ners' liability.' 1 87 Attorneys may also fear clients asking for fee re-
ductions in exchange for the reduced liability exposure. 88
Understandably, firm attorneys express concern over the way in
which clients will perceive the firm's conversion to LLP status. Still,
firms which "soft-pedal" the conversion may jeopardize partners' pro-
tection from vicarious liability. Consider the LLP announcement by a
"Big Six" public accounting firm which notified recipients that part-
ners of the firm would no longer risk personal liability as a result of
actions in which they had no involvement and over which they have
no control.' 8 9 This form announcement was accompanied by a per-
sonally addressed letter which stated in part: "Let me reaffirm, how-
ever, that the Firm and the professionals who work with you will
187. Darryl Van Duch, Some Firms Hesitate to Adopt L.L.P., NAT'L L.J., May 5, 1997,
at Al, A20 (quoting Professor Carter Bishop on the "public relations impact" of con-
verting to LLPs). In discussing why 28 of the 40 megapartnerships headquartered in New
York have not shifted to LLPs, John McCabe, legislative director of the Uniform Law
Commissioners explained,
For some of the largest go-go firms in New York to maintain their long-time rela-
tionships with clients, they're going to have to spell out in new retainer agree-
ments exactly who is going to stand behind the work of the firm. The clients are
going to want to see all the senior partners personally responsible.
Id. at A20. But see Stephen E. Kalish, Lawyer Liability and Incorporation of the Law
Firm: A Compromise Model Providing Lawyer-Owners with Limited Liability and Impos-
ing Broad Vicarious Liability on Some Lawyer-Employees, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 563, 580
(1987) (asserting that clients do not expect to hold lawyer-owners personally responsible
for the acts or omissions of one of the firm's lawyer-employees).
188. In challenging Professor Ribstein's assumption that creditors pay premiums for
unlimited liability, Professor Hamilton asserts that law firms should reduce their rates
when they become LLPs. See Hamilton & Ribstein, supra note 88, at 705. Rather than
reducing their fees, recent surveys reveal that the majority of firms are increasing their
billing rates. The 1995 Attorney Billing & Compensation Survey conducted by the State
Bar of Texas Department of Research & Analysis revealed that only 4% of the respon-
dents had decreased their hourly rates during the prior three years; slightly more than half
of the attorneys who use hourly billing reported that they had increased their hourly rates
during the prior three years; and 41% reported that their hourly rates had remained the
same over that time period. See Cynthia L. Spanhel & Leah V. Shimatsu, Texas Attorneys
Report on Hourly Rates, TEX. B.J., Feb. 1996, at 114, 115. On the national level, billing
rates have been climbing steadily, along with firm profits, salaries, billable hours, and hir-
ing. See Hope Viner Samborn, Business Is Booming, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 34, 34. Ac-
cording to information obtained in a survey of 400 law firms, billable rates for attorneys
with 25 to 29 years of experience increased from an average of $184 an hour in 1993 to
$200 in 1996. See id. Another national survey conducted in conjunction with the Law
Office and Management Administration Report found that the national median hourly bill-
ing rate for partners as of June 1, 1996 was $183 per hour, an increase of about 4.5% since
1995. See Donna Gill, National Survey Gives Billing and Pay Rates, CHICAGO LAW., Mar.
1997, at 64.
189. See LLP Announcements: Damage Control, 82 J. TAX'N 127, 128 (1995) (reporting
on the announcement of a large CPA firm which converted to a Delaware registered LLP).
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continue to stand fully behind our work."19 The attempt to put a
"positive spin" on the LLP conversion creates various questions and
potentially confuses recipients on whether firm members will remain
vicariously liable for malpractice committed by others in the LLP.19'
This illustrates how communications and conduct of firm attorneys
can fail to preserve or even negate the liability shield.
Clients who have relied on communications from a firm and the
conduct of its attorneys may assert equitable estoppel. 192 As sug-
gested above, if firm partners communicate to clients and prospective
clients that all partners will stand behind one another's work product,
the firm partners should be estopped from relying on the liability
shield.
Similarly, an aggrieved client could attempt to invoke a doctrine
of reasonable expectations. 93 Previously courts have considered rea-
sonable beliefs and expectations in determining both the existence 194
190. Id.
191. See id. (concluding that the accounting firm's announcement "serves notice on us
all that comforting one's clients while simultaneously trying to reduce one's potential per-
sonal liability to those clients is a tricky task").
192. In this context, equitable principles prevent firm partners from escaping personal
liability because of statements, representations, and conduct which communicated that the
firm operated as a traditional partnership. Equitable estoppel requires the following:
First, the [firm partner], who usually must have knowledge, notice or suspicion of
the true facts, communicates something to [the client] in a misleading way, either
by words, conduct or silence. Second, the [client] in fact relies, and relies reason-
ably or justifiably, upon that communication. And third, the [client] would be
harmed materially if the [firm partner] is later permitted to assert any claim in-
consistent with his earlier conduct. A fourth element is that the [firm partner]
knows, expects or foresees that the [client] would act upon the information given,
or that a reasonable person in the [firm partner's] position would expect or fore-
see such action.
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 65 (2d ed. 1993) (citations omitted).
193. Beginning in the early 1960s, courts employed the doctrine of honoring the rea-
sonable expectations of insurance policy holders. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I.
WIDISS, INSURANcE LAW 630-32 (1988) (describing the historical development of the doc-
trine). When applying the doctrine, "court[s] will protect the reasonable expectations of
applicants, insureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding the coverage afforded by insur-
ance contracts even though a careful examination of the policy provisions indicates that
such expectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the insurer." Id. at 633.
194. See, e.g., Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, writ denied) (concluding that an attorney-client relationship can be "implied
from the conduct of the parties"); In re Anonymous, 655 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind. 1995) (noting
that the putative client's subjective belief that he is consulting a lawyer in his professional
capacity and the putative client's intent to seek professional advice are important factors in
determining if an attorney-client relationship should be implied by conduct of parties). But
cf. Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997,
n.w.h.) (focusing on the "objective manifestations" necessary to support a finding that an
attorney-client relationship existed).
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and scope of an attorney-client relationship.1 95 In considering client
expectations and a firm's conversion to limited liability status, Profes-
sor Deborah A. Demott made the observation:
Clients may well expect members of the firm, individually, to
monitor the work done under the firm's auspices. They may ex-
pect that, by holding themselves out as a single firm, members of
even a large multi-site firm warrant their belief that firm work
meets at least minimal professional standards. Thus, clients may
expect firm members to stand behind the quality of the firm's
work and to be accountable for lapses in that work's quality.
They may expect members of the firm, regardless of their choice
of organizational form, to have staked their professional reputa-
tions on the quality of their fellow professionals' work as well as
on the quality of their own individual work. It is not evident
why adding "L.L.P." or "A Professional Limited Liability Com-
pany" to the firm's letterhead should defeat those
expectations.
196
If malpractice plaintiffs can convince the court that they had reason-
ably understood that all partners would be responsible for acts and
omissions of firm representatives, the court could hold all partners
personally liable.
In asking a court to honor their reasonable expectations, clients
might point to firm communications, beginning with promotional ma-
terial such as firm brochures.1 97 A sample of firm brochures obtained
from many of the largest firms in Texas indicates that firms use differ-
ent approaches to disclosing their organizational structure. 198  The
majority of the LLP firms only use the L.L.P. initials in the firm name;
a few use the words "limited liability partnership." One firm brochure
waits until the last page to note that the firm is a registered limited
liability partnership. Obviously, firm partners who want to avoid
claims based on reasonable expectations should use more than the
minimum statutory initials.
195. See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 810 P.2d 661, 664 (Colo. 1991) (explaining that the
attorney-client relationship gives rise to a continuing duty to a client "unless and until the
client clearly understands, or reasonably should understand that the relationship is no
longer to be depended on"); Practical Offset, Inc. v. Davis, 404 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980) (concluding that a client who retained attorney to consummate a sale of assets
could infer that the scope of the attorney's employment encompassed the filing of a financ-
ing statement).
196. Deborah A. Demott, Our Partners' Keepers? Agency Dimensions of Partnership
Relationships, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 129 (1995).
197. Large and small firms alike use brochures to market their legal services and to
create a firm "image." See Jill Schachner Chanen, Getting the Word Out, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1997, at 84, 84.
198. Brochures are on file with the author.
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Firm partners should also recognize that statements made in firm
communications could bolster a claim based on reasonable expecta-
tions. Many brochures make reference to the "team approach," "col-
lective expertise" and collaborative efforts. 199 Depending on the
strength and context of such statements, clients could assert that they
understood that partners would work together and monitor quality
and performance.
Clients might also rely on statements made in the initial engage-
ment agreements. For example, a specimen engagement letter pub-
lished by the ABA Section of Law Practice Management states, "All
legal work performed will ... be monitored and approved by one of
the partners of the firm." 200 A client could rely on such a statement in
seeking to hold one or more firm partners personally liable for an
associate's malpractice. As discussed in the next section, malpractice
plaintiffs may expand the number of personally liable attorneys by al-
leging some form of supervisory liability.
C. Supervisory Claims and Intra-firm Conflicts
Most LLP statutes extend a partner's personal liability to cover
the acts and omissions of persons under a partner's supervision.20'
The statutes use different approaches to impose supervisory liabil-
ity.20 2 Most make partners liable for persons under their direct super-
vision and control.20 3 Others use verbal formulations describing when
supervisors will be held liable.2 4 None of the statutes offers much
guidance as to precisely when a partner should be held personally lia-
ble for the misconduct of other persons in the partnership.20 5 In dis-
199. For example, one page of a firm's brochure uses the word "team" three times.
200. WIN-WIN BILLING STRATEGIES: ALTERNATIVES THAT SATISFY YOUR CLIENTS
AND You 192 (Robert C. Reed ed., 1992).
201. Similarly, several PC and LLC statutes extend personal liability to persons under
a professional's direct supervision or control. See Donn, supra note 28, at 251 (supervisory
liability in PCs); Robert R. Keatinge & George W. Coleman, Professional Practices, Q243
ALI-ABA 203, 234 (1996) (supervisory liability in LLCs and LLPs).
202. For a discussion of the different statutory approaches, see Goforth, supra note
141, at 1154-56.
203. See id. at 1154 (identifying 31 statutes in which the "direct supervision and con-
trol" language appears).
204. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (Vernon Supp. 1997) (pro-
viding that an LLP partner is not individually liable for debts and obligations arising from
the acts and omissions of other firm representatives not working under the supervision or
direction of the first partner at the time the "errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence,
or malfeasance occurred, unless the first partner: (a) was directly involved in the specific
activity... ; or (b) had notice or knowledge of the errors, omissions, negligence, incompe-
tence, or malfeasance by the other partner or representative at the time of occurrence").
205. See Goforth, supra note 141, at 1154-56.
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cussing supervisory liability and the meaning of "direct supervision
and control," Professor Robert Hamilton poses the following
questions:
How close does supervision have to be to constitute "direct" su-
pervision? Does it cover the ultimate responsibility that a se-
nior partner or rainmaker in a law firm has for "his" client? Is it
limited to the mid-level partner who actually does the work or
who supervises associates and more junior partners when they
do the work? Does it extend to members of the opinion com-
mittee of a law firm who review all formal legal opinions before
they are released?206
Professor Hamilton suggests that these are "fact-specific questions on
which there is no statutory guidance."2 7 Fact-specific questions also
arise when LLP statutes do not clarify whether a supervisor will be
held liable for mere supervision without the showing of careless or
negligent conduct on the part of the supervisor.20 8
206. Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1082. For an analysis of statutory liability using spe-
cific examples of law firm partners serving in different capacities, see BROMBERG & RIB-
STEIN, supra note 20, § 3.04(b), 3.3(a), at 125-26. In an attempt to limit the supervisory
liability of managing partners, some attorneys are considering stating in their partnership
agreements that managing partners do not directly supervise the day-to-day work of each
of the firm's lawyers. See Daniel R. White, LLP Legislation Passed in Florida, Colorado, 1
No. 5 L. FIRM PARTNERSHIP AND BENEFITS REP., June 1995, at 9, 9 (quoting Robert Keat-
inge who stated that such a provision in a partnership agreement "doesn't hurt" provided
that it "reflects what's really going on" in the partnership). For an example of a partner-
ship agreement provision which attempts to delineate the supervisory responsibility of
managing attorneys, see Robert R. Keatinge, The Floggings Will Continue Until Morale
Improves: The Supervising Attorney and His or Her Firm, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 279, 305-06
n.84 (1998) [hereinafter Keatinge, The Floggings Will Continue].
207. Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1082. In answering questions related to supervisory
liability, one commentator believes that the more directly a partner works with a super-
vised person and the more direct "hands on" supervisory responsibility the partner has, the
more likely that the partner will be held liable for the acts and omissions of the supervised
person. See Francis J. Mellen, Jr. et al., Limited Liability Companies and Registered Lim-
ited Liability Partnerships in Kentucky: A Practical Analysis, 22 N. Ky. L. REV. 229, 262-63
(1995).
208. See Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers, supra note 14, at 113-114 (suggesting
that attorneys should assume that the statutory provisions impose supervisory liability re-
gardless of fault). But see Robert R. Keatinge & George W. Coleman, The Right Entity
May Limit Your Liability, L. PRAC. MGMT., July-Aug. 1995, at 22, 27 (recommending that
liability "be limited to those who have exercised negligent supervision, which is probably
direct personal liability for negligence, in any case, rather than personal liability assigned
to someone who happens to hold the title of manager or practice group leader"). For
arguments supporting this recommendation, see Keatinge, The Floggings Will Continue,
supra note 206, at 302-313. Some LLP statutes do base supervisory liability on negligence.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS. § 9-307(C)(1) (Supp. 1996) (stating that part-
ners are liable if they are "negligent in appointing, directly supervising, or cooperating with
the other partner, employee, or agent").
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The lack of clarity on the degree and quality of supervisory in-
volvement can lead to litigation.20 9 In attempting to hold partners
personally liable, a plaintiff could name as defendants all managing
partners, section leaders, and other partners who participated in the
representation. 21° Although some commentators believe that liability
should only be imposed on attorneys actively involved in the repre-
sentation,2 ' the questions of supervisory liability will ultimately de-
pend on the factual circumstances.212
A plaintiff might also assert that all firm partners should be per-
sonally liable because each partner has an affirmative duty to monitor
other partners.21 3 The federal government took this tack in suing
some law firms following the failure of various savings and loan as-
sociations.214 In those actions, the government alleged that each law
firm partner was personally liable for failing to monitor the conduct of
other firm partners.215 Plaintiffs may take a similar approach in at-
tempting to bypass the statutory limit on vicarious liability by alleging
that law firm partners are directly liable for failing to monitor other
209. See Cane & Franco, supra note 61, at 1304 ("Because the degree and quality of
supervisory involvement necessary for liability is unclear, vertical liability will undoubtedly
be the subject of litigation.").
210. See Ribstein, supra note 28, at 323 (suggesting that the statutory recognition of
supervisory liability "will cause plaintiffs' lawyers to press the courts to expand partners'
direct liability to the limits permitted by the statutory language"). Professor Ted Schneyer
questions whether the "mere discussion and development of the firm's internal controls
will lead to personal liability." Schneyer, supra note 119, at 274.
211. See, e.g., Lubaroff, supra note 76, at 25 ("An intimate involvement in supervision
and control in connection with what is going on with respect to a matter appears to be
required as a precursor to the imposition of liability."); Thomas W. Van Dyke & Paul G.
Porter, Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Generation, J. KAN. B. Ass'N, Nov. 1994,
at 16, 19 ("The [LLP] language certainly contemplates attentive, almost vigilant supervi-
sion and control. It appears that a department head, or one merely possessing ultimate
responsibility over a matter or client, would not have sufficient direct 'supervision and
control' to unveil such partner's personal assets to a potential claimant.").
212. See John Richards, Note, Illinois Professional Service Firms and the Limited Lia-
bility Partnership: Extending the Privilege to Illinois Law Firms, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 281,
287 (1996) (explaining that in order to determine whether a person had "direct supervision
and control" over another person, Illinois courts have employed a "flexible rule that takes
into account [the] factual circumstances in each individual case"). In pointing to material
fact questions on whether attorney-shareholders "should be personally liable for their ac-
tions regarding representation," the New Mexico Supreme Court recently reversed a sum-
mary judgment for members of a professional corporation. Sanders, Bruin, Coll & Worley,
P.A. v. McKay Oil Corp., 943 P.2d 104, 105 (N.M. 1997).
213. See Davis, supra note 89, at 5 (noting that plaintiffs may sue all partners asserting
that the partners did not meet their ethical responsibilities under Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3).
214. See Fortney, Am I My Partner's Keeper?, supra note 113, at 331-36 (discussing the
practical consequences of the government's allegations).
215. See id. at 332 (citing complaints filed against law firms and their attorneys).
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firm agents.216 Until courts reject "failure to monitor" allegations as
disguised vicarious liability claims, firm partners may be forced to de-
fend against such allegations.
Ironically, by increasing the number of partners sued, a plaintiff
may reduce the amount of insurance available to pay claims and set-
tlements. Under most legal malpractice policies, the defense costs are
subtracted from the limits of liability. If potential conflicts of interest
prevent one counsel from defending all the claims against the defen-
dant-attorneys, then the defense costs for providing multiple defense
counsel will be subtracted from the available limit of liability, thus
reducing the amount available to pay plaintiffs. 17 In negotiations
with plaintiffs, defense attorneys can use this self-reducing feature of
the insurance policies and the statutory liability shield in attempting to
convince plaintiffs to accept a settlement funded by insurance.21 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Nationwide, firm attorneys embraced the LLP structure as a kind
of catastrophe protection against vicarious liability when firms ex-
haust insurance and other assets available to pay claims.2 19 In jump-
ing on the LLP bandwagon, many attorneys may not have fully
appreciated the professional responsibility and liability issues associ-
ated with attorney-fiduciaries practicing in LLP firms. Standards that
216. For an analysis of a partners' duty to monitor their peers, see id. at 348-61. My
survey of members of the Houston Chamber of Commerce revealed that 82% of the re-
spondents (76 persons) believed that law firm owners have a "legal duty to monitor the
manner in which all attorneys in their firm practice," regardless of firm structure. Another
15% of the respondents (14 persons) indicated that they did not know if such a legal duty
exists and only 3% of the respondents (3 persons) believed that attorneys did not have a
legal duty to monitor other firm attorneys. Survey results on file with the South Texas Law
Review. For a discussion of the survey, see supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
217. For a discussion of these insurance issues, see Fortney, Seeking Shelter, supra note
118, at 741-45.
218. See Sheldon I. Banoff, New Ruling Adds Further Encouragement for Large Firms
To Form LLCs, 81 J. TAX'N 12, 12 (1994) (explaining that professional firms incorporated
to at least "generate a 'colorable claim' defense, whereby a better settlement might be
reached with the firm's creditors than if the professionals continued to operate in general
partnership form").
219. See Edward A. Adams, Firms Expected To Make Switch to New Format: Limited
Liability Partnerships Seen Restricting Exposure, 212 N.Y. L.J., 1, 2 (1994) (noting that
"[t]he kind of disaster that would prompt use of LLP provisions is exceedingly rare").
Robert O'Malley, loss prevention counsel for the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society,
which insures many of the nation's largest firms, reported that only a few small firms have
faced judgments in excess of their malpractice policy's limits and only one large firm ex-
ceeded its policy limits. See id.
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may be appropriate for LLP businesses in the rough-and-tumble mar-
ketplace do not suffice for attorneys.22 °
I urge the ABA Ethics Committee and state ethics committees to
modify their ethics opinions to acknowledge the special relationship
between attorneys and their clients, and the potential for clients to be
misled by an LLP firm that looks like and functions like a traditional
partnership. Recognizing that state ethics rules only set the minimum
level of conduct for attorneys to avoid discipline,22' courts must care-
fully evaluate professional responsibility questions raised by LLP law
firms.
Academicians and practitioners are beginning to question
whether the rule-based approach to ethics has caused the legal profes-
sion to lose its moral compass.222 Recently, the ABA Board of Gover
nors appointed The Special Committee on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, called Ethics 2000. The Ethics 2000 Committee
will study and evaluate the ethical and professional precepts of the
legal profession.223 In this study, the Ethics 2000 Committee should
explore modifying the procedures224 and expanding the charge of the
220. In recommending that attorneys adopt standards of conduct that meet the public's
reasonable expectations, Professor Ann Maxey concludes by stating that "rules that take
into account the public's reasonable expectations are not only good for society, but they
are good for lawyers earning a living within the restraints of practicing a profession." Ann
Maxey, Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers' Liability After Central Bank, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2185, 2238 (1996).
221. While "the Model Rules of Professional Conduct set a minimum level of conduct
with the consequence of disciplinary action, malpractice liability is premised upon the con-
duct of the 'reasonable' lawyer." 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 137, § 18.7, at 581.
222. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethi-
cal Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 886-87 (1996) (contrasting "technocratic lawyer-
ing" with genuine deliberations). At the ABA's 23rd National Conference on Professional
Responsibility held on May 29, 1997, Lawrence J. Fox, a member of the ABA Ethics Com-
mittee who practices with the Philadelphia firm of Drinker, Biddle & Reath, moderated a
panel discussion on The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Have We Lost Our Profes-
sional Values? In his remarks, Mr. Fox called for a "broader devotion to ethics than is
stirred by the Model Rules." ABA Speakers Debate Proposals for Reshaping Ethics Rules,
13 LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 158, 158 (June 11, 1997).
223. See Memorandum from N. Lee Cooper, President of the ABA, to ABA Board of
Governors (Apr. 15, 1997) (on file with the South Texas Law Review). The charge of the
Ethics 2000 Committee also includes evaluating the Model Rules and the rules governing
professional conduct in the state and federal jurisdictions; conducting original research,
surveys and hearings; and formulating recommendations. See id. Chief Justice E. Norman
Veasey, of the Delaware Supreme Court, chairs the 10-person committee. See Rex Bos-
sert, Overhauling Ethics, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 1997, at A4, A4 (listing committee members);
see also James Podgers, Model Rules Get the Once-over, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 90, 90
(discussing the reasons for appointing the Ethics 2000 Committee).
224. In investigating a mechanism for obtaining public comment from members of the
legal community and the consuming public, the Ethics 2000 Committee should study
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ABA Ethics Committee so that ethics opinions can provide guidance
beyond the rules.
Finally, the Ethics 2000 Committee should seriously evaluate the
consequences and wisdom of attorneys practicing in limited liability
law firms. When the LLP movement swept through the country, pro-
ponents used the "liability crisis" to justify the radical restructuring of
partnership law.225 Now, national data on legal malpractice claims in-
dicate that "It]here is no crisis with respect to rising malpractice claims
against lawyers. ' 226 Understanding that there is no liability crisis may
help lawyers reconsider whether the catastrophe insurance provided
by the LLP structure justifies attorneys hiding behind the LLP fence.
Finman and Schneyer's recommendations for improving ethics opinions. See Finman &
Schneyer, supra note 121, at 145-67.
225. See Goforth, supra note 141, at 1140-41.
226. ABA Report Examines New Data on Legal Malpractice Claims, 13 LAWS. MAN. ON
PROF. CONDUCr (ABA/BNA) 110, 110 (Apr. 30, 1997) (quoting Kirk R. Hall, chief execu-
tive officer of the Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund, and author of the recently
released ABA report on malpractice claims). The ABA report, Legal Malpractice Claims
in the 1990s, provides a comprehensive collection and examination of national data on
malpractice claims from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1995, reported by lawyer-owned
and commercial malpractice insurers. See id. According to the 1996 study, "most malprac-
tice insurers have seen only a small and gradual increase in frequency and severity [of
malpractice claims] over the last decade." ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROF'L
LIAB., LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN THE 1990s 20 (1996).
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